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THE MEANING OF A MISDEMEANOR IN A 
POST-FERGUSON WORLD: EVALUATING 
THE RELIABILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTION 
EVIDENCE 
John D. King* 
Despite evidence that America’s low-level courts are 
overburdened, unreliable, and structurally biased, 
sentencing judges continue to uncritically consider a 
defendant’s criminal history in fashioning an 
appropriate punishment. Misdemeanor courts lack 
many of the procedural safeguards that are thought to 
ensure accuracy and reliability. As with other stages of 
the criminal justice system, people of color and poor 
people are disproportionately burdened with the 
inaccuracies of the misdemeanor system.  
This Article examines instances in which sentencing 
courts have looked behind the mere fact of a prior 
conviction and assessed whether that prior conviction 
offered any meaningful insight for the subsequent 
sentence. This Article then proposes a framework by 
which defendants should be allowed to challenge the use 
of prior conviction evidence in the sentencing context, 
arguing that the government should bear the burden of 
persuasion once the defendant sufficiently satisfies a 
burden of production. Ultimately, however, this Article 
suggests that courts and legislatures consider 
categorical exemptions from the use of prior 
misdemeanor convictions in imposing sentences. Failure 
to critically examine this evidence risks introducing and 
compounding the biases and errors of low-level courts 
into more serious sentencing proceedings.  
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In 2014, the shooting of an 18-year-old, unarmed black man by a 
white police officer sparked demonstrations and civil unrest in 
Ferguson, Missouri.1 One of many unforeseen consequences of these 
events was a reevaluation of how America’s low-level courts 
administer justice. The 2015 Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department Report2 forced 
Americans to consider the realities of not only how poor Americans 
are policed, but also how they are adjudicated in America’s courts.3 
While some debate whether, and to what extent, the situation 
described in the Ferguson Report is an outlier,4 other sources lend 
support to the idea that America’s low-level courts are failing to 
deliver on the promise of due process, fundamental fairness, and 
accurate factfinding.5 Critiques of the misdemeanor adjudication 
system have a long history.6 But the greatly expanded reach of the 
 
 1  See generally Timeline of Events in Shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, AP NEWS 
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/9aa32033692547699a3b61da8fd1fc62. 
 2  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter 
FERGUSON REPORT]. 
 3  See Terrence McCoy, Ferguson Shows How a Police Force Can Turn into a Plundering 
‘Collection Agency’, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/05/ferguson-shows-how-a-
police-force-can-turn-into-a-plundering-collection-agency/?utm_term=.1cef407c4b6c 
(“[W]hen people couldn’t pay, they were arrested.”). 
 4  See Richard Rosenfeld, Ferguson and Police Use of Deadly Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 1077, 
1077 (2015) (examining the differences between Ferguson and surrounding communities that 
may have made Ferguson uniquely ripe for civil unrest, including “aggressive enforcement of 
municipal ordinances to generate revenue, inadequate training and supervision related to 
police use of force, and a pattern of racial bias in policing” (citing FERGUSON REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 2)). 
 5  See Samuel R. Gross, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. REV. 999, 1009–
10 (2018) (questioning law enforcements’ and prosecutors’ factfinding processes in light of a 
study that showed almost eighty percent of misdemeanor exonerations were based on guilty 
pleas entered into “without a chemical test for innocence”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012) (“Most U.S. convictions are 
misdemeanors, and they are generated in ways that baldly contradict the standard due 
process model of criminal adjudication.”); Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 
96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1999 (2016) (explaining that some appellate courts conceded that 
admission of more than five prior convictions “hinted at ‘prosecutorial overkill’ and violations 
of due process”). 
 6  See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 
644 (1956) (discussing how certain summary procedure practices deprive defendants of “the 
most elementary requirements of a fair hearing”); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE 
PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 290–92 (1979) 
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criminal justice system and scope of consequences of a conviction 
give this topic new urgency. 
The Ferguson Report makes plain just how easy it is for poor 
people and people of color to amass low-level criminal convictions in 
American courts.7 This Report and other sources also demonstrate 
how the American system of low-level criminal adjudication 
prioritizes mass processing and efficiency over accurate factfinding 
and meaningful assignment of moral blameworthiness.8 Ferguson 
exposed a single judicial system, but increasing data show the 
unreliability and structural unfairness of factfinding in low-level 
courts more broadly.9 In a post-Ferguson world, how should courts 
evaluate prior conviction evidence when imposing sentences or 
determining whether an accused person qualifies for an aggravated 
charge as a recidivist? A sentencing judge confronted with a 
defendant who has, for example, one (or a few) misdemeanor 
convictions from 2013 Ferguson, Missouri has a choice to make. 
Traditional theories and practices of sentencing direct the judge to 
sentence the defendant more harshly because of the defendant’s 
prior criminal record.10 Should the judge automatically apply the 
 
(criticizing rising pretrial costs for frustrating the “adjudicative ideal” and rendering proper 
justice unavailable for many criminal defendants). 
 7  See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 62 (concluding that the Ferguson Police 
Department’s racially-driven actions imposed a disparate impact on African Americans); see 
also Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
731, 749 n.85 (2018) (explaining the Ferguson Report, which found that police “over-enforce 
low-level criminal laws and routinely make unjustified arrests that never result in formal 
charges”). 
 8  See generally Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014) (explaining how “mass misdemeanor” policing induces prosecutors 
and courts to process people through quick plea bargaining rather than affording defendants 
meaningful opportunities to build a case). 
 9  See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 160 (2011) (examining the errors in the cases of the first 207 
wrongfully convicted people to be exonerated by DNA testing and reporting that fifty-three 
percent of exonerees took the stand at trial to claim their innocence); see also DNA 
Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Jan. 
27, 2020) (reporting that there have been 367 DNA exonerations to date, wrongfully convicted 
defendants served an average number of fourteen years in prison, sixty-nine percent of 
exonerations involved eyewitness misidentification, forty-four percent involved 
misapplication of forensic science, and twenty-eight percent involved false confessions). 
 10  See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND 159–62 (2018) (discussing the 
“additive imperative” of increasing levels of control and punishment based on prior criminal 
justice encounters); see also Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal 
Justice, 128 YALE L.J. 1648, 1670–73 (2019); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (laying out the broad considerations when sentencing 
defendants). 
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relevant sentencing enhancement, whether formal or informal? Or 
should the judge allow what she knows about that court at that time 
to affect how she evaluates that prior conviction evidence? How 
different are other misdemeanor courts? What about the mass 
adjudication of immigration offenses?  
Courts have long used prior convictions to enhance sentences and 
even to upgrade charges.11 Every sentencing guidelines system, for 
example, assigns additional aggravating points for prior 
convictions.12 This practice rests on the assumptions that (1) prior 
convictions accurately reflect past conduct,13 and (2) prior 
convictions render the defendant more deserving of punishment for 
the crime at hand.14 But as research continues to reveal the 
problems of accuracy in the criminal justice system,15 the first of 
these assumptions is called ever more directly into question, 
especially when the prior conviction was for a minor crime. After 
the wave of exonerations based on DNA over the last couple of 
decades,16 scholars have begun to focus on the challenges of accurate 
factfinding in the lower courts.17  
 
 11  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Three-strikes laws provide one example of 
this use of prior convictions. See David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of 
“Three Strike” Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 
9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 558 (2000) (noting that twenty-two states adopted “three 
strike” laws, under which a person convicted of three serious felonies would automatically 
receive an enhanced sentence); see also, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1804 (noting that a repeat 
offender can receive three times the statutory maximum if the offender has been convicted of 
the same or a similar crime twice before). 
 12  See Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End 
of the Prior-Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 525 n.4 (2014) 
(explaining the widespread practice of prior conviction sentence enhancement and giving the 
examples of Wisconsin and Florida, where a prior conviction can transform a civil infraction 
into a criminal offense and a murder charge to a capital offense, respectively). 
 13  See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 565 
(2014) (“Yet the most basic assumption of all—the one on which all the others are built—has 
received far less attention: the assumption that the conviction is a reliable indicator of the 
defendant's relative culpability.”). 
 14  See USSG ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (“A defendant with a record of prior criminal 
behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment.”). 
On the theoretical debate of whether defendants with prior convictions should be sentenced 
more harshly and why (or why not), see Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of 
Desert, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 
(Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010) [hereinafter PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT 
SENTENCING], and Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to 
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING, supra. 
 15  See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. 
 16  See supra note 10. 
 17  See Natapoff, supra note 5, at 116 (“Lacking evidentiary rigor and adversarial testing, 
[the world of low-level criminal adjudication] is a world in which a police officer’s bare decision 
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In this context, how should courts assess claims by defendants 
that a prior conviction is unreliable, inaccurate, or structurally 
unsound? Presumptions of regularity and finality generally have 
barred defendants from collaterally challenging a prior conviction.18 
Courts have been extremely reluctant to allow for any inquiry into 
the procedural validity of a prior conviction, relying instead on the 
principle of regularity in using such a criminal history in a 
sentencing hearing or at trial of another charge.19 But in light of the 
increasing body of scholarship about factual inaccuracies and 
procedural irregularities in criminal adjudication,20 this Article 
argues that courts should adopt a framework that allows defendants 
to mount these collateral attacks more freely. Traditional 
assignments of burden of proof should evolve to reflect what we now 
know about wrongful convictions and the vagaries of factfinding in 
low-level courts. If we take seriously the critiques of our criminal 
justice system, we should make the effects of prior convictions less 
absolute and allow defendants broader latitude to attack the 
fairness and accuracy of prior convictions in subsequent 
proceedings. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the research 
regarding the lack of procedural safeguards in low-level courts and 
how the results in such courts lack reliability. This Part argues that 
outcomes in low-level criminal courts more accurately reflect 
structural bias than an accurate adjudication of factual guilt. Part 
III discusses courts that have looked skeptically at prior conviction 
evidence in the sentencing and impeachment contexts and argues 
 
to arrest can lead inexorably, and with little scrutiny, to a guilty plea. It is, in other words, a 
world largely lacking in a scrutinized evidentiary basis for guilt and therefore one in which 
the risk of wrongful conviction is high.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of 
Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (2005) (arguing that the criminal justice 
system encourages defendants to remain silent during their proceedings, which paves the 
way for governmental overreach); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining 
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011) 
(questioning the accuracy of factfinding when defendants are routinely pressured to waive 
the right to counsel or enter quick guilty pleas without adequate time to consult with an 
attorney); see generally Gross, supra note 5.  
 18  See, e.g., Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 (2001) (barring certain 
collateral attacks on prior convictions based on a “need for finality of convictions and ease of 
administration” and noting the multiple other forums that allow defendants to challenge 
judgments); United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
Guidelines ‘do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction 
or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law.’”(citations omitted)). 
 19  See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1001. 
 20  See supra notes 5–6, 10, 17. 
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that the realities of today’s criminal justice system require this more 
discerning approach to such evidence. Part IV analyzes the 
historical role played by the presumption of regularity and 
instances in which this presumption has been overcome. This Part 
concludes by proposing a procedural framework by which a court 
should consider a defendant’s claim that a prior conviction should 
not be considered due to alleged unfairness or unreliability in the 
process by which it was obtained. This Part argues that once the 
defendant has satisfied the burden of production by making a 
credible claim of constitutional invalidity, the prosecution should 
bear the burden of persuasion in such a collateral attack. 
Ultimately, this Part argues that legislators should consider 
exempting misdemeanor convictions from any calculation of 
criminal history because of the lack of reliability in those 
proceedings. Part V concludes. 
II. FAILURES OF MISDEMEANOR COURTS 
Many courts reflexively assume that evidence of a defendant’s 
prior conviction is necessarily a meaningful criterion to be factored 
into the sentencing calculus. But scholars have recently challenged 
“the reliability of a conviction as an indicator of relative culpability 
[due to] the growing body of data on wrongful convictions . . . and on 
disparities in law enforcement, and on the nature and dominance of 
plea-bargaining.”21 More broadly, some have begun to challenge the 
very notion that the existence of a prior conviction reliably indicates 
anything about a defendant’s character.22 Anna Roberts, for 
example, argues that courts can no longer assume that a prior 
conviction has any meaning relative to a defendant’s character for 
truthfulness because of three developments in the criminal justice 
system: (1) adversarial collapse, (2) unequal enforcement of 
 
 21  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 563 (first citing Montré D. Carodine, “The 
Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment 
Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 526 (2009); and then citing Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of 
Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 
723, 725 (2013)). 
 22  See id. at 580 (arguing that before using a prior conviction, sentencing courts should 
“first investigate whether the conviction is itself a reliable indicator of relative culpability”); 
see also Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 635, 679 (2003) (“A conviction simply makes it somewhat more 
likely the defendant committed the misconduct.”).  
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criminal laws, and (3) the widening scope of criminal prosecutions.23 
Because low-level courts lack the formal procedural safeguards of 
felony courts and because the norms of practice in low-level courts 
result in less accurate and reliable outcomes, prior convictions from 
these courts should be subject to close scrutiny. 
A. PRACTICALITIES: AN INSIGHT INTO TODAY’S MISDEMEANOR 
COURTS 
Misdemeanor courts have never enjoyed the same degree of 
procedural fairness as felony courts.24 Many of those accused of 
misdemeanor criminal activity lack the right to court-appointed 
counsel.25 Even when the formal right to counsel applies, 
misdemeanor courts often are characterized by a shockingly low 
standard of practice by defense counsel.26 And of course the federal 
constitutional right to a jury also does not apply in many 
misdemeanor trials.27  
The vastly expanded volume of misdemeanor cases being 
processed in American courtrooms has aggravated these formal 
 
 23  See id. 
 24  See generally John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the 
Adjudication of Misdemeanors in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 30–33 (E. Luna & M. Wade eds., 2012); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 10; 
Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738 (2017); 
Natapoff, supra note 5; see also Jenny Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 
98 B.U. L. REV. 779, 809–15 (2018). 
 25  See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (deciding that the U.S. Constitution did 
not require a state trial court to appoint counsel where a defendant was charged with a 
statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction was authorized but not actually 
imposed); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (deciding that the right to counsel 
extends only to offenses for which imprisonment would be imposed); see also John D. King, 
Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2013) (explaining the arbitrary dichotomy of “petty” and “serious” offenses and the practice 
of appointing counsel in misdemeanor cases only if the defendant is actually sentenced to a 
period of incarceration). 
 26  See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE 257–66 (2009) (describing the lack of monitoring 
mechanism “to keep track of the extent of ordinary injustice”); ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET 
AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE 31–32 (2009) 
(discussing a process that often occurs in misdemeanor courts, known as “meet-and-plead,” 
where cases are resolved at the first court hearing with minimal or no preparation by the 
defense); King, supra note 24, at 42 (“A recurring and enduring problem in both the 
substantive and procedural justice offered by misdemeanor courts is the abysmal state of 
indigent misdemeanor representation in many parts of the country.”). 
 27  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (declaring that petty offenses may 
be tried without a jury because only defendants accused of serious crimes are afforded that 
right). 
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distinctions.28 The sheer quantity of defendants in these systems 
results in a lack of individualized attention to any one case and the 
absence of meaningful adversarial process over the long run.29 
Finally, it is well-documented that the vagaries of the misdemeanor 
adjudication system do not fall randomly across all segments of 
society.30 As with virtually every other stage of the criminal justice 
system, people of color and poor people are disproportionately 
burdened by the inaccuracies and errors of the misdemeanor 
adjudication system.31 Those with mental illnesses, too, are more 
likely to end up in the low-level criminal courts, as “more than half 
of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem” and 
many of them were incarcerated for misdemeanors like DUI, 
larceny, and drug possession.32 
When the Ferguson Report was released, it shed light on the 
manner in which many criminal cases are resolved in the United 
States, bluntly declaring that the City’s “law enforcement practices 
are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public 
 
 28  See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 7, at 737 (estimating that approximately 13.2 
million misdemeanor cases are filed in the United States each year). 
 29  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 30  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing 
Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236 (2013); Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental 
Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607 (2013).  
 31  See Roberts, supra note 24, at 822 (explaining how racial disparities are particularly 
significant in misdemeanor cases due, in part, to deliberate policing choices linked to 
non-white neighborhoods); see also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 
149–57 (2018).  
 32  DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf; see also JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS 
BERZOFSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: 
INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 
2011–2012, at 6 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf (finding that 
prisoners incarcerated for property crimes were just as likely to have a mental illness as those 
incarcerated for violent offenses); ANNA GUY, AMPLIFYING VOICES OF INMATES WITH 
DISABILITIES PRISON PROJECT, LOCKED UP AND LOCKED DOWN: SEGREGATION OF INMATES 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 5 (2016), http://avidprisonproject.org/assets/locked-up-and-locked-
down----avid-prison-project.pdf (showing that the use of segregation in prisons and jails often 
exacerbates prisoners’ mental illnesses); Terry Smerling, Opinion, L.A. County Needs to 
Construct Mental Health Programs, Not Just Jails, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-smerling-mental-illness-jails-20140505-
story.html (advocating for more treatment programs to keep low-risk offenders with mental 
illnesses out of jail and noting that a Miami-Dade misdemeanor diversion program reduced 
the recidivism rate from seventy-five percent to twenty percent). 
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safety needs.”33 The municipal court in Ferguson was a monument 
to revenue collection and seems to have acted more as a collection 
agency than anything that could be described as an adversarial 
system.34 As of October 2014, the municipal court had 103,000 cases 
pending in a town with 21,000 residents.35 Up to 500 people would 
appear before the court in a single session.36 The court was not only 
physically located within the Ferguson Police Station but was also 
overseen by the Ferguson Chief of Police,37 who acted as the direct 
supervisor of court staff.38 Most cases, of course, were resolved by 
plea,39 as is now true in all American criminal courts.40 The court 
clerk was granted the authority to accept guilty pleas and set 
bond.41 Although the court was empowered to incarcerate people 
found guilty, it rarely did so in the first instance, preferring to 
impose fines instead.42 Those who either did not pay their fines on 
time or who missed court, however, frequently ended up spending 
time in jail as a result.43  
The court described in the Ferguson Report bears little 
resemblance to the theoretical ideal that law students learn about 
in their criminal law and procedure courses. Defendants are 
routinely convicted of charges without receiving meaningful notice 
and the sheer volume of cases precludes a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard.44 Those defendants or their attorneys who do try to 
 
 33  FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
 34  See supra note 3 (describing commentary regarding the Ferguson municipal court and 
its focus on generating revenue). 
 35  FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 6, 9 (providing that as of October 31, 2014, there 
were 53,000 traffic and 50,000 non-traffic cases on the court docket). 
 36  Id. at 9. 
 37  Id. at 8. 
 38  See id. (“Court staff report directly to the Chief of Police.”). 
 39  See id. at 43 (“We have concerns . . . about the trial processes that apply in the rare 
occasion that a person does attempt to challenge a charge.”); see also Gaby Del Valle, Most 
Criminal Cases End in Plea Bargains, Not Trial, OUTLINE (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://theoutline.com/post/2066/most-criminal-cases-end-in-plea-bargains-not-
trials?zd=1&zi=hhhy6uhu (stating that 97% of state level felonies result in a plea). 
 40  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET 3 tbl. 2, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-
statistics/state-district-circuit/2017/dcc17.pdf (providing that 97.2% of criminal cases in fiscal 
year 2017 resulted in a guilty plea). 
 41  FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
 42  See id. at 8–9 (providing that the municipal judge has sentenced someone to jail as a 
penalty for a violation only once and almost always imposes the monetary penalty instead). 
 43  See id. at 9 (“As a result, violations that would not normally result in a penalty of 
imprisonment can, and frequently do, lead to municipal warrants, arrests, and jail time.”). 
 44  See id. at 71–88 (providing an overview of the relationship between race and law 
enforcement officers). 
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engage in adversarial litigation are punished for it.45 The Report 
includes an excerpt of an email from the lead prosecuting attorney 
admitting to harsher treatment for defendants whose attorneys 
“go[] off on all the constitutional stuff.”46 
Although Ferguson presents an extreme example, many of the 
dynamics described in the Report will be familiar to those who 
appear in low-level courts in the United States. The astounding 
volume of cases being processed through such courts makes things 
like Brady47 disclosures a rarity, and tales of attorneys—or, more 
commonly, their clients—being punished for aggressively litigating 
cases in low-level courtrooms are common.48 The Ferguson 
municipal judge confirmed that “it is not uncommon for him to add 
charges and assess additional fines when a defendant challenges 
the citation that brought the defendant into court.”49 With these 
 
 45  See id. at 43 (“Attempts to raise legal claims are met with retaliatory conduct.”); see also 
Alexa Van Brunt, Opinion, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who Are too Overworked to 
Defend Them, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2015, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-
overworked (“[P]re-trial detainees incur a ‘trial tax’—those who decide to fight their case are 
forced to stay in jail longer than those who plead guilty.”). 
 46  FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 44. 
 47  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 48  See Beth Schwartzapfel, New York Courts Say: Hand It Over, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 
8, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/08/new-york-courts-say-
hand-it-over (stating Brady material is often never disclosed due in part to the fact that 
almost all convictions are secured by plea and noting that thirty-eight percent of the 234 
exonerations in New York involved Brady violations). 
 49  FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 49. The Report shows a system driven primarily as 
a revenue generator:  
In March 2010, for instance, the City Finance Director wrote to Chief 
Jackson that “unless ticket writing ramps up significantly before the end of 
the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections next year. . . . Given 
that we are looking at a substantial sales tax shortfall, it’s not an 
insignificant issue.” Similarly, in March 2013, the Finance Director wrote to 
the City Manager: “Court fees are anticipated to rise about 7.5%. I did ask 
the Chief if he thought the PD could deliver 10% increase. He indicated they 
could try.” 
Id. at 2. Of course, the emphasis on revenue generation was passed on to patrol officers. And 
as Ferguson’s strategy paid off, it did what any rational profit-maximizing corporation would 
do: it expanded. In January 2013, the City Council approved additional municipal court 
positions on the basis of the City Manager’s argument that “each month we are setting new 
all-time records in fines and forfeitures” and that the increased salaries for court personnel 
“will be more than covered by the increase in revenues.” Id. at 9. Most infamously, the Report 
describes a Ferguson woman who parked her car illegally in 2007. She received a citation 
requiring her to appear in court, a $151 fine, and additional fees. After missing several court 
dates, she was charged with seven counts of failure to appear, each of which was accompanied 
by an arrest warrant and additional financial penalties and fees. Because of her inability to 
pay, she was arrested on warrants on two separate occasions, spent six days in jail, and has 
paid $550 to the court. Her case was still open at the time of the release of the Ferguson 
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informal norms actually governing the adjudication of 
misdemeanors in many courtrooms, it is little wonder that many 
defendants choose to exit the system as quickly and quietly as 
possible, without contesting the charges against them. As long as 
the process costs of adjudicating a misdemeanor exceed the direct 
consequences of a conviction, it will continue to be a rare defendant 
in most misdemeanor systems who fights their charge by going to 
trial.50  
B. LACK OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which first applied to 
state prosecutions in Gideon v. Wainwright,51 was extended to 
certain misdemeanors in Argersinger v. Hamlin52 in 1972. Seven 
years later, in Scott v. Illinois,53 the United States Supreme Court 
limited the reach of the Sixth Amendment to only those 
misdemeanors in which the defendant faced the threat of 
incarceration.54 As this doctrine developed to categorically exclude 
any misdemeanors that did not carry the actual possibility of jail 
time, courts and prosecutors quickly realized that they could 
streamline the process by “waiving” the possibility of jail time and 
proceeding without appointing counsel for indigent defendants.55 By 
making the securing of a criminal conviction less costly in terms of 
both time and money, courts allowed for the expansion of the mass 
processing of low-level convictions.56 Even where defense counsel 
 
Report, and she still owed an additional $541, all from a single instance of illegal parking 
that occurred over seven years earlier. See id. at 4. 
 50  See FEELEY, supra note 6, at 290–92. 
 51  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 52  407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 53  440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 54  See id. at 373–74 (deciding that the U.S. Constitution did not require a state trial court 
to appoint counsel where a defendant was charged with a statutory offense for which 
imprisonment upon conviction was authorized but not actually imposed). 
 55  Writing separately in Argersinger, Justice Powell foresaw some of the direct and 
collateral consequences that would make a simplistic dichotomy between “petty” and 
“serious” cases increasingly untenable. 407 U.S. at 47–48 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The 
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period served under the 
sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal record on 
employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label 
‘petty.’”). 
 56  The Ferguson Report details how few of the defendants had court-appointed counsel. 
See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 2, at 25 (describing how officers frequently made contempt 
arrests when they felt disrespected by something subjects said); see also id. at 49 
(documenting that courts held defendants in contempt when they merely asked questions 
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are present in misdemeanor courtrooms, the standard of practice is 
often appallingly low.57 Whether physically present or not, an 
ineffective lawyer not only fails her client, but also degrades the 
court’s ability to reach accurate, fair, and just results.58 The defense 
lawyer has been called the “master key” to unlock the other 
mechanisms to promote fair and just adjudication in court.59 
Because the Sixth Amendment assures the right to a jury only 
for serious offenses, it does not apply to many misdemeanor 
offenses.60 In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court rationalized that “the 
possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty 
offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to 
efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration 
resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury 
adjudications.”61 Each state determines which offenses are 
serious,62 but generally serious offenses are those that carry a 
penalty of more than six months of incarceration.63 Although some 
states provide a broader right to trial by jury than the federal 
constitutional right,64 many misdemeanors fall below both state and 
 
during their proceedings and that it was not uncommon for the municipal judge to “add 
charges and assess additional fines when a defendant challenge[d] the citation that brought 
the defendant into court”). 
 57  See Van Brunt, supra note 45 (discussing how Washington State’s publicly appointed 
defense attorneys spend less than one hour per case and have caseloads of 1,000 
misdemeanors per year, which prevents them from conducting core legal functions such as 
factual investigations). 
 58  See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (“[R]epresentation by 
counsel ‘is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.’” (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984))). 
 59  See Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on 
“the Most Pervasive Right” of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1962). 
 60  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (“It is doubtless true that there is a 
category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
provision . . . .”). 
 61  Id. at 160. 
 62  The Duncan Court declined to settle “the exact location of the line between petty 
offenses and serious crimes.” Id. at 161. 
 63  See Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (stating that an offense with a 
maximum incarceration period of six months is presumptively petty). 
 64  See State v. Becker, 287 A.2d 580 (Vt. 1972) (providing the right to a jury trial in all 
criminal cases, including misdemeanors with no imprisonment penalty); see also Bado v. 
United States, 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018) (guaranteeing the right to a jury trial to defendants 
who face a deportation penalty); State ex rel. McDougall v. Strohson, 945 P.2d 1251, 1252–53 
(Ariz. 1997) (stating that the court determines whether the right to a jury trial attaches by 
assessing the length of potential incarceration, the moral quality of the charged act and the 
relationship of the act to common law crimes); State v. Slowe, 284 N.W. 4, 6 (Wis. 1939) 
(stating that the right to a jury trial applies to misdemeanor offenses). 
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federal thresholds, leaving defendants with the limited options of 
either pleading guilty or proceeding with a bench trial. 
Considering the scarcity of zealous defense counsel, the 
exceedingly rare involvement by a jury, and a vanishingly small 
percentage of cases decided by any kind of trial at all, it is difficult 
to characterize misdemeanor adjudication as a truly adversarial 
system. Contrary to traditional notions that American criminal 
justice is reliable because of the strong procedural safeguards in 
place to guard against wrongful convictions, the current system of 
criminal adjudication has been accurately described as one of 
“adversarial collapse.”65 The American Bar Association has 
described the state of indigent defense systems in the United States 
as “in a state of crisis, resulting in a system that lacks fundamental 
fairness and places poor persons at constant risk of wrongful 
conviction.”66  
Appeals of convictions from misdemeanor courts are very rare. A 
recent study estimated that fewer than one in a thousand 
misdemeanor convictions is appealed to an intermediate appellate 
court.67 This can be attributed in part to the high rate of plea 
agreements, in which prosecutors often insist on a defendant’s 
waiver of the right to appeal.68 The lack of zealous defense counsel 
also contributes to this issue, as many defendants are precluded 
from seeking an appeal if their counsel did not preserve certain 
objections.69 Without effective counsel, many defendants are 
 
 65  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 580 (“[A] growing sense of adversarial collapse, bolstered 
by wrongful convictions data, makes increasingly tenuous an unquestioning assumption that 
a conviction is itself a reliable indicator of relative culpability.”); see also King, supra note 24, 
at 30–33; Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or System Problem?, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 739, 740 (2006) (“[T]he premise of our adversarial system is that the clash between 
partisan advocates produces reliable, accurate results.”); Fred Zacharias, Structuring the 
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 61 
(1991) (“When the system breaks down in a significant respect, the codes can no longer expect 
competition to achieve adversarially appropriate results.”). 
 66  ABA STANDING COMM’N ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE—A REPORT ON THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 38 (2004). 
 67  See Nancy J. King & Michael Heise, Misdemeanor Appeals, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1933, 1941 
(2019). Even in federal court, defendants appeal only around five percent of misdemeanor 
convictions. See JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999 WITH TRENDS 1985–99, at 1, 3 (2001), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf. 
 68  See Roberts, supra note 17, at 337 (“[P]rosecutors sometimes insist on a waiver of the 
right [to appeal] as part of any plea bargain.”). 
 69  See id. at 339 (noting the barrier of a petitioner’s failure to raise an issue in an earlier 
proceeding). 
 
2020]   THE MEANING OF A MISDEMEANOR 941 
 
unaware either of their right to appeal or of the various filing 
deadlines and procedural requirements to note an appeal.70 With so 
few charges resolved by trial and even fewer reviewed by an 
appellate court, actors in the misdemeanor system are governed 
more by informal norms of conduct than by formal rules of 
procedure and doctrine. 
With so many convictions secured by guilty plea,71 the most 
important procedural protection that is often absent in 
misdemeanor cases may be the knowing-and-voluntary 
requirement for guilty pleas. The United States Supreme Court has 
ruled that guilty pleas “not only must be voluntary but must be 
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”72 But because of 
the woeful state of indigent defense, especially in low-level cases, 
many defendants enter guilty pleas with no understanding of the 
likely consequences of this action.73 The Court has yet to require 
defense counsel to advise defendants of any indirect consequence of 
a guilty plea except in the immigration context.74 And given the 
realities of low-level practice (and time-served plea offers in the face 
of seemingly endless delay), defendants are very unlikely to factor 
in future sentencing events when evaluating whether to plead 
guilty.75  
Of course, prior convictions that were obtained 
unconstitutionally may not be used to enhance a criminal sentence 
 
 70  See id. at 337–38 (discussing how ineffective counsel limits the opportunities available 
to defendants and noting that “individuals who plead guilty in the fast-paced, high-volume 
lower criminal courts may not even be aware of the right to appeal . . . .”).  
 71  See Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ 
(discussing how “estimates for misdemeanor convictions [resulting from guilty pleas] run 
even higher” than ninety-seven percent). 
 72  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 73  See Yoffe, supra note 71 (explaining that defendants accused of misdemeanors often do 
not request counsel and that poor defendants who are not able to post bond plead guilty to 
avoid waiting in jail for an investigation); see also Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor 
Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 171 n.1 (2017) (explaining that misdemeanor sentences 
can be as high as ten years and often result in defendants being fired from jobs, barred from 
future employment, deported, evicted or refused housing). 
 74  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (deciding that the distinction between 
collateral and direct consequences was ill-suited to the deportation context, so the counsel’s 
failure to correctly advise defendant of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea 
amounted to constitutionally deficient performance). 
 75  See Van Brunt, supra note 45 (discussing how pre-trial detainees rarely have more than 
a brief conversation with their lawyer before pleading guilty and reach this decision in part 
due to the “trial tax”—the fact that those who decide to fight their case stay in jail for longer). 
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for a subsequent offense.76 Any criminal conviction with a sentence 
involving incarceration secured without either the presence of 
counsel or a valid waiver of counsel by the defendant is 
unconstitutional.77 A valid waiver of one’s right to counsel must be 
done knowingly and intelligently to satisfy constitutional 
requirements, and courts should indulge a presumption against 
waiver of constitutional rights.78 But if the realities of misdemeanor 
practice preclude appellate review of waivers of the right to counsel 
and to trial, it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to know when such 
waivers were validly given.79 
The lack of procedural safeguards in misdemeanor courts 
suggests a rate of wrongful convictions higher than the known rate 
for felony convictions.80 Lacking recourse to a jury trial, and often 
 
 76  See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (“The admission of a prior criminal 
conviction which is constitutionally infirm . . . is inherently prejudicial . . . .”). 
 77  See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent 
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, 
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). Of course, 
misdemeanor offenses carrying no possibility of incarceration do not confer a constitutional 
right to counsel. See id. at 40. (deciding that the right to counsel extends only to offenses for 
which imprisonment would be imposed); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) 
(deciding that the Constitution did not require a state trial court to appoint counsel where a 
defendant was charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction was 
authorized but not actually imposed). A criminal conviction of an unrepresented defendant 
in such a case does not require either the presence of counsel or a valid waiver to comply with 
constitutional requirements. Id.  
 78  See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (providing that a waiver is an 
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” but that “‘courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights” 
(citations omitted)). This presumption against waiver is especially strong with regard to a 
criminal defendant’s right to counsel, which has been described as the “master key.” See John 
D. King, Beyond Life and Liberty: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) 
(referring to “the right to counsel [as] the ‘master key’ to all of the other rights-protecting and 
reliability-ensuring rules of criminal procedure”). 
 79  See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM’N, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 85 (Apr. 
2009), https://archive.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf. (“[T]here is a shocking disconnect 
between the system of justice envisioned by the Supreme Court’s right-to-counsel decisions 
and what actually occurs in many of this nation’s courts.”). 
 80  See Samuel R. Gross, Opinion, The Staggering Number of Wrongful Convictions in 
America, WASH. POST (July 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-cost-of-
convicting-the-innocent/2015/07/24/260fc3a2-1aae-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html 
[hereinafter Gross, Wrongful Convictions in America] (“The problem may be worst at the low 
end of the spectrum, in misdemeanor courts where almost everybody pleads guilty. . . . In the 
past year, 45 defendants were exonerated after pleading guilty to low-level drug 
crimes . . . .”); see also Samuel R. Gross, Race and Wrongful Convictions in the United States, 
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.
pdf [hereinafter Gross, Race and Wrongful Convictions] (“Misdemeanor convictions 
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without the assistance of counsel, a person charged with a 
misdemeanor has powerful incentives to plead guilty regardless of 
the evidence in the case or the defendant’s factual guilt or 
innocence.81 An offer to plead guilty to a misdemeanor with no 
additional jail time can make the prospect irresistible.82 And the 
millions of misdemeanor convictions83 that are secured by guilty 
plea each year are never subjected to any meaningful adversarial 
testing.84 Without these procedural safeguards, the reliability and 
accuracy of outcomes in low-level courts is questionable. 
C. UNRELIABILITY IN ADJUDICATING GUILT 
Logic and experience dictate that many misdemeanor convictions 
are obtained with little regard to the facts of the case or the 
applicable law.85 In his essay, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 
Samuel Gross describes some categories of known misdemeanor 
exonerations, in which the vast majority of defendants opted for a 
quick guilty plea with little direct punishment over the prospect of 
a more protracted process.86 One typical scenario is a felony that 
“falls apart and is dumped by a prosecutor who offers the defendant 
 
outnumber felonies by at least four to one, but account for less than four percent of 
exonerations . . . . Clearly, only a tiny fraction of innocent defendants who are convicted of 
misdemeanors or non-violent felonies are ever exonerated.” (citations omitted)). 
 81  See Gross, Wrongful Convictions in America, supra note 80 (“Why then did they plead 
guilty? As best we can tell, most were held in jail because they couldn’t make bail. When they 
were brought to court for the first time, they were given a take-it-or-leave-it, for-today-only 
offer: Plead guilty and get probation or weeks to months in jail. If they refused, they’d wait 
in jail for months, if not a year or more, before they got to trial, and risk additional years in 
prison if they were convicted. That’s a high price to pay for a chance to prove one’s 
innocence.”). 
 82  See Gross, supra note 5, at 1004 (“Hundreds of thousands of defendants plead guilty 
every year to avoid pre-trial detention for . . . misdemeanors. Why wouldn’t they? They may 
face months in jail waiting for trial, but get weeks or days—or no time at all—if they plead 
guilty.”). 
 83  See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 7, at 737 (estimating approximately 13.2 million 
misdemeanor cases are filed each year in the United States). 
 84  See Gross, supra note 5, at 1004–05 (“Plea bargaining is the great American method of 
sweeping problems in criminal cases under the rug. The defendant’s constitutional rights 
were violated? No problem; offer him a good enough deal, he’ll plead guilty, and that’ll be the 
end of it. The evidence of guilt stinks? If you reduce the charges enough, he’ll probably go for 
it, and we’ll never have to present any evidence.”). 
 85  See id. at 999 (“There’s every reason to worry that many defendants who are convicted 
of misdemeanors, usually by guilty pleas, are innocent—but there are hardly any data that 
speak to that issue.”).  
 86  See id. at 1009–10 (discussing the case of Harris County, Texas supporting the 
conclusion many defendants accused of misdemeanors accepted guilty plea offers).  
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a no-time misdemeanor plea bargain.”87 One judge described the 
defendant who accepted such an offer as having “just bought an 
insurance policy.”88  
The vast majority of criminal convictions are obtained by plea 
rather than by adversarial testing at trial.89 Because of the 
breakdown in real adversarialism in criminal cases, some have 
argued that the “assumption of reliability [of criminal convictions] 
needs to be reexamined.”90 Indeed, the system has evolved in the 
past half century91 to embrace efficiency and mass processing, 
sacrificing accuracy and reliability of outcomes as a result.92 Anna 
Roberts additionally cites the inadequate provision and quality of 
defense counsel as negatively impacting reliability, stating that “the 
kind of representation that can help to ensure reliability is often 
lacking.”93 The modern nature of plea bargaining, with so much of 
the power in the hands of the prosecutor, further undercuts claims 
of reliability.94 Various strong pressures encourage defendants 
 
 87  Id. at 1001. 
 88  Id. One of the more illuminating categories of known misdemeanor exonerations 
concerns those charged with misdemeanor drug possession for substances later determined 
not to be drugs. Id. at 1009–10. During the data collection period Gross describes, only one 
jurisdiction had the practice of testing suspected illegal substances after the defendant 
entered a plea of guilty to possessing them. Id. In at least fifty-eight instances in this county, 
defendants opted for a quick misdemeanor guilty plea to drug possession at their first court 
appearance even when the substance in question was not illegal drugs. Id. Eventually, after 
testing the suspected substances, the prosecutor’s office secured exonerations for those 
defendants. Id. Regardless, these cases demonstrate innocent people’s willingness to opt for 
a quick conviction instead of a lengthy pre-trial process, the likelihood of pre-trial detention, 
and an uncertain outcome at trial. Id. at 1003–04. 
 89  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 578 (“[I]n most cases the convictions will have been 
garnered through a guilty plea . . . .”); see also Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: 
Rethinking the Search for Truth, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 912 (2011) (“The current 
American system is marked by an adversary process so compromised by imbalance between 
the parties—in terms of resources and access to evidence—that true adversary testing is 
virtually impossible.”). 
 90  Roberts, supra note 13, at 581. 
 91  Almost a half century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “the volume of 
misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession 
for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 34 (1972). 
 92  See Findley, supra note 89, at 912 (“If one were asked to start from scratch and devise 
a system best suited to ascertaining the truth in criminal cases, . . . what would that system 
look like? It is inconceivable that one would create a system bearing much resemblance to the 
criminal justice process that we now have in the United States.”). 
 93  Roberts, supra note 13, at 581. 
 94  See id. at 582 nn.148–49 (“Plea bargains can be swiftly accomplished, and countless 
pressures push defendants toward this outcome.” (first citing Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon 
Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1049, 1072, 1081–82 (2013); and then citing Jenny 
Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (2013))). 
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toward guilty pleas regardless of guilt in low-level cases, and “the 
adversarial truth-seeking process . . . has become increasingly 
irrelevant.”95 Because of the heightened pressures toward quick 
resolution and the lack of procedural safeguards in low-level courts, 
misdemeanor convictions are likely far less reliable than felony 
convictions.96  
Of course, the unfairness of America’s criminal courts is not 
evenly or randomly distributed. Notwithstanding decades of 
rhetoric targeting racial and economic disparities in the criminal 
justice system, people of color and poor people continue to bear the 
brunt of a structurally unfair system.97 Federal rates of 
incarceration are almost twice as high for Latinos, and more than 
five times higher for African Americans, than for white Americans.98 
Among those convicted, people of color are sentenced to periods of 
 
Roberts cites the trial tax, delay, and fear of factfinder bias as reasons that a defendant might 
choose a plea bargain regardless of factual guilt or innocence. Id. at 582–83. 
 95  See Natapoff, supra note 94, at 1071 (arguing that “the misdemeanor system burdens 
and pressures defendants regardless of the evidence, their rights, or their culpability”); see 
also Darryl K. Brown, American Prosecutors’ Powers and Obligations in the Era of Plea 
Bargaining (“[W]hen pleas replace trials, most of the systemic components of public 
adjudication that serve the objectives of factual reliability and accurate normative judgment 
are missing—the jury, evidentiary disclosure, rules of evidence, formal adversarial challenges 
to state evidence, and so on.”), in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 24, at 200, 204; Roberts, supra note 13, at 584 (“[F]ar from a fair fight, the 
conviction-production process is often a scramble to grab the least bad option before the risk 
of trial. It would be a miracle if the results were reliable.”). 
 96  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 584–85 (stating that misdemeanor convictions have a 
“shaky foundation” because misdemeanors are generally not subject to investigation); see also 
King, supra note 24, at 30–33 (describing how the danger of wrongful convictions in 
misdemeanors lies in the “nonfeasance, rather than the misfeasance or malfeasance, of the 
prosecutor”); Gross, Race and Wrongful Convictions, supra note 80, at 17 (providing that 
misdemeanor convictions outnumber felonies by four to one, but account for less than four 
percent of exonerations and concluding that “[c]learly, only a tiny fraction of innocent 
defendants who are convicted of misdemeanors or non-violent felonies are ever exonerated”). 
 97  See, e.g., CATHERINE V. BEANE, MOVING TOWARD A MORE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO 
JUSTICE REFORM 2 (Feb. 2008) (“A defining characteristic of America’s criminal justice system 
is its disproportionate impact on the poor and people of color . . . .”); see generally ALEXANDER, 
supra note 30 (arguing that the American criminal justice system acts as a modern-day 
system of racial control); COLE, supra note 30 (contending that constitutional protections from 
police power are not extended to minorities and the poor). 
 98  See Carol A. Brook, Racial Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 LITIG. 
15, 15 (2008) (“In federal prison, people of color make up almost 75 percent of the prison 
population, although they constitute only 25 percent of the U.S. population. Worse, 
African-Americans alone make up almost 40 percent of the federal prison population, 
although they constitute only 13 percent of our country's population.”); see also Criminal 
Justice Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, 
https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (“In 2014, 
African Americans constituted 2.3 million, or 34%, of the total correctional 
population . . . [and] are incarcerated at more than 5 times the rate of whites.”). 
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incarceration approximately twenty-five percent longer than white 
defendants.99 
Eisha Jain criticizes a focus on “exceptional” cases that might 
warrant relief, arguing that our focus instead should be on the 
“typical” misdemeanor prosecution and the unfair way that it is 
adjudicated.100 Misdemeanor offenses are often the easiest cases to 
prove in that they “typically ‘lack robust mens rea requirements,’ 
meaning that they are designed to ease the path of prosecution.”101 
Misdemeanor cases are generally staffed by the least experienced 
prosecutors and defense lawyers.102 And misdemeanors are seen as 
“disposable” in that everyone involved wants to dispose of them 
quickly.103 
It is not much of an exaggeration to state that criminal procedure 
matters very little in the adjudication of misdemeanors.104 Jain 
explains that  
the procedural hurdles meant to ensure a fair process 
either do not exist or do not work as intended in the 
misdemeanor context. Misdemeanants get a 
watered-down version of the doctrinal protections that 
apply to felonies. Defendants are not entitled to counsel 
or jury trials in all low-level cases.105  
And even where those protections are theoretically or doctrinally 
present, the realities of misdemeanor prosecution render them 
unavailable or illusory in practice.106 Misdemeanor courts sort 
 
 99  See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in 
Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2007) (discussing the sentencing gap between 
African Americans and other groups). 
 100  See Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 955 
(2018) (arguing that relief efforts should account for the systemic unfairness in the 
misdemeanor process). 
 101  See id. at 956 (quoting Natapoff, supra note 5, at 1358–59). 
 102  See id. (“They are staffed by the least experienced lawyers or even with no lawyers at 
all.”).  
 103  See id. at 956–57 (“The cases are considered ‘disposable’ in every sense of the word: 
lawyers are trained to dispose of them quickly, and defendants themselves have powerful 
perceived incentives to resolve them quickly.”). 
 104  See id. at 959 (“None of this [criminal procedure] amounts to much in misdemeanor 
courts.”). 
 105  Id.  
 106  See id. (explaining that obtaining legal counsel is often practically inaccessible because 
“[m]any jurisdictions charge fees for court-appointed attorneys” and “overworked defense 
attorneys . . . provide no meaningful advice”). 
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people into two categories with little regard either for legal guilt or 
moral blameworthiness.107 Although this lack of rigorous testing 
and factual accuracy might be defended on the grounds of “low 
stakes,”108 the ever-expanding network of collateral consequences 
makes that argument less and less tenable every day. Every 
subsequent sentence enhancement or application of a recidivist 
statute may compound the arbitrariness and structural unfairness 
of misdemeanor courts. 
III. INFORMED SKEPTICISM OF PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE 
In a misdemeanor courtroom, it can seem that the short-term 
interests of all parties are in a quick resolution: a guilty plea with a 
time-served sentence. Such a resolution terminates the case quickly 
and efficiently. The judge moves a case off of her docket, the 
prosecutor secures a conviction, and the defendant is out of jail and 
home. Courts evaluating these convictions at later sentencing 
events, however, must take a longer-term view and ascribe meaning 
to each conviction, asking whether, and to what extent, those 
convictions justify harsher punishment. Rather than unthinkingly 
tallying up each prior conviction on a predetermined grid,109 courts 
should conduct a more searching inquiry into whether a particular 
prior conviction reliably speaks to the moral culpability and 
criminal history of the defendant. 
A. RACE 
People of color are disproportionately implicated at every stage 
of the American criminal justice system.110 U.S. District Court 
Judge Nancy Gertner took account of the potential impact of race 
on prior convictions when she sentenced Alexander Leviner, a 
 
 107  See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 10, at 223 (“[L]ower criminal courts are not 
primarily adjudicative, merely processing people by resolving criminal cases.”); see also King, 
supra note 24, at 3 (arguing that the misdemeanor process sorts defendants “into two groups, 
not on the basis of guilt or innocence, but rather on their willingness to pay the ‘process costs’ 
of an overburdened system” (citing FEELEY, supra note 6, at 290–92)).  
 108  But see Roberts, supra note 73, at 171 (“There is no such thing as a low-stakes 
misdemeanor.”). 
 109  See, e.g., Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 27 (2005) (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines dehumanize 
offenders by mechanically inserting certain variables into a formula and scoring punishments 
on a two-dimensional grid). 
 110  See, e.g., Sterling, supra note 30, at 660–62. 
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defendant with a long history of convictions for petty offenses.111 
Leviner pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.112 
In calculating his criminal history score, Judge Gertner noted that 
a technically accurate calculation of Leviner’s criminal history score 
placed him in Criminal History Category V, the second-highest 
category in the system, even though his criminal record mostly 
consisted of motor vehicle offenses and minor drug possession 
charges.113 His only conviction for a crime of violence was a 
sixteen-year-old conviction for assault, which occurred when 
Leviner was seventeen years old.114  
Stating that the Guidelines were “not to be applied 
mechanistically” and that the court would not ignore “fairness” or 
“logic,” Judge Gertner concluded that the criminal history 
calculation overstated the defendant’s culpability and sentenced 
Leviner as if he were in a lower criminal history category.115  
Judge Gertner found that accepting the initial calculations would 
“replicate disparities in state sentencing” and exacerbate racial 
disparities in traffic stops and arrests of people of color.116 Further, 
not only were many of Leviner’s convictions for driving after his 
license was suspended, but also he was sentenced to either 
suspended or active jail time in each of them, which drove his 
criminal history score higher still.117 The offenses became 
“countable” as prior criminal history because Leviner received more 
than thirty days of imprisonment.118 Again, Judge Gertner 
wondered aloud about the impact of race: “[W]ithout knowing the 
 
 111  United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 (D. Mass. 1998) (“[W]hile Leviner has a 
relatively long record, it consists almost entirely of motor vehicle offenses, and minor drug 
possession charges.”). 
 112  Id. at 24. 
 113  Id. at 25. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. at 24 (“[E]ven more profound concerns are raised where, as here, the defendant is 
African American, the convictions were largely motor vehicle offenses, for which the 
defendant was imprisoned. The scholarly and popular literature strongly suggests that there 
is racial disparity in the rates at which African American are stopped and prosecuted for 
traffic offenses. That literature, together with the specific facts about Leviner’s record and 
background, compel me to depart from the Guideline range.”). 
 117  See id. at 28–29 (explaining that additional points will be added to the criminal history 
if the defendant has experienced a prior sentence of imprisonment of certain durations (citing 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018))). 
 118  See id. at 33 (“[T]hese stops evolved into ‘countable’ offenses under the Guidelines only 
because they were offenses for which Leviner received more than thirty days’ 
imprisonment.”). 
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specific facts surrounding each sentence, this record raises concerns 
at the very least. Would others have received the same sentence who 
were similarly situated . . . ?”119 She considered several scholarly 
sources on the racial disparities in the rate at which people of color 
are stopped, charged, prosecuted, and aggressively sentenced for 
criminal offenses.120 Ultimately, Judge Gertner concluded that to 
count each of Leviner’s prior criminal convictions as the Guidelines 
dictate would only replicate and magnify prior racial disparities in 
sentencing Leviner for the felon-in-possession charge, and she 
departed downward from the Guideline range and sentenced 
Leviner as if he were in a lower criminal history category.121 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, like many state guideline 
systems,122 explicitly forbid the consideration of race in 
sentencing.123 In section 5H1.10, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
declares that race is “not relevant in the determination of a 
sentence.”124 If this is understood as mandating a “race-blind” 
approach to sentencing, however, the result will only replicate, 
exacerbate, and magnify the racism that has already occurred in 
prior interactions between defendants of color and the criminal 
justice system.125 The legislative history to the act establishing the 
guidelines seems to take a more nuanced view, setting forth that 
“[t]he requirement of neutrality with regard to such factors [as race] 
 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id.  
 121  Id. at 25. Judge Nancy Gertner later explained her decision in the Leviner case:  
The guidelines’s emphasis on criminal history enhances whatever inequities 
were embodied in past sentences. I sentenced a man for the crime of “felon 
in possession of a firearm,” whose criminal record scored high on the 
guidelines. When I looked closely, I noticed that all the scored offenses were 
nonviolent, traffic offenses—for instance, driving after his license was 
suspended. And then I wondered: Since no other traffic offense accompanied 
the license charges, how did the man get stopped? I strongly suspected 
“Driving While Black.” I departed downward, refusing to give literal credit 
to the record.”  
Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A View from the Bench, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 23 
(2002). 
 122  See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2.D.2 (MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMM’N 2019) (forbidding race to be considered as a basis for departing from a presumptive 
sentence); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-801(b)(3) (2019) (“Sentencing criteria should be neutral 
with respect race . . . .”). 
 123  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) 
(explaining that race is not a relevant factor to the determination of a sentence). 
 124  Id. 
 125  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal 
Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 8 (2007) (discussing the “ability to foresee the future racial 
consequences of the criminal justice system choices that we make today”). 
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is not a requirement of blindness.”126 By distilling this guidance into 
a flat statement that race is “not relevant,” however, the Sentencing 
Commission dangerously oversimplifies how previous racial bias 
and disparity should be factored into sentencing decisions.127 
B. CITIZENSHIP 
Immigration-related offenses are—like the traffic offenses at 
issue in Leviner—another area in which convictions are generated 
at high volume and through increasingly informal procedure.128 
Immigration-related prosecutions have come to predominate in 
many federal criminal courtrooms and have become the subject of 
creative procedural shortcuts.129 Because of the high volume of cases 
in many dockets, these cases can be among the most egregious in 
lacking due process and fundamental fairness.130 
One description of such a courtroom—a federal district court in 
the District of Arizona—challenges traditional notions of how 
criminal convictions are secured in American courts: 
U.S. District Court Judge Leslie Bowman’s court had 
been in session for less than 14 minutes, but as usual, 
it had been a busy 14. She’d already deported eight 
Central American men and was seconds away from 
deporting six more, who stood nervously before 
her. . . . Most [of these men] faced misdemeanor charges 
for illegal entry into the U.S., and [Judge] Bowman was 
preparing to dismiss the cases and order them deported. 
But for Guatemalan immigrant Manuel Lux-Tom, it 
was different. This was his second time being caught 
crossing the border, and federal officials who wanted 
him in jail were insisting that Lux-Tom stand trial at a 
 
 126  Brook, supra note 98, at 18 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 3354 n.409). 
 127  USSG § 5H1.10. 
 128  See Miriam Jordan, Swift Frontier Justice for Migrants Brought to Federal Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/border-immigration-
courts.html (explaining how President Trump’s zero-tolerance policy has swiftly flooded 
southern criminal courthouses, with nearly sixty percent of all criminal prosecutions in April 
2018 for immigration violations). 
 129  See id. (describing the Bush-created Operation Streamline as “assembly-line justice” 
because of the common mass multiple-defendant proceedings and how due process might be 
undermined by this rush to convict). 
 130  See id. (quoting the executive director of Federal Defenders of San Diego, who said that 
“providing meaningful representation becomes all but impossible”). 
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later date when the court could handle his case. 
Lux-Tom’s attorney, Richard Bacal, objected. Bacal 
argued [that] his client had been the victim of a rigged 
and unfair system during his previous trial in Pecos, 
Texas. In that case, Bacal said, Lux-Tom had never 
talked to an attorney alone—he’d only seen one in a 
group meeting along with 20 other men being detained. 
No one had asked Lux-Tom, who speaks his native 
language of K’iche’, if he needed or wanted a translator, 
and he’d been found guilty with literally no idea what 
was happening, Bacal argued.131 
Like many of those being processed through federal courtrooms 
on the southern border, Lux-Tom spoke neither English nor 
Spanish.132 But he was not provided an interpreter in a language 
that he understood.133 Judge Bowman responded to Lux-Tom’s 
objection with striking candor, acknowledging “that a person could 
probably make it through the proceedings without a thorough 
understanding of their rights and the court proceedings.”134  
The ease with which a criminal defendant could be convicted 
with no knowledge of the meaning of the proceedings escalated in 
2005 with the introduction of Operation Streamline, which reduced 
procedural safeguards and enabled courts to process people at a 
“breakneck pace.”135 In such cases, prosecutors frequently offer a 
time-served sentence in exchange for a quick guilty plea.136 As with 
all kinds of misdemeanors, this result can seem like a win for all 
 
 131  John Stanton, The Courts Where Some Immigrants Plead Guilty Without Knowing 
What’s Happening, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/johnstanton/immigration-border-operation-
streamline-due-process.  
 132  Id. (“Though the men had been given interpreter headsets, they were largely 
ceremonial: None of the men spoke English or enough Spanish to participate in the hearing.”). 
 133  Id.  
 134  Id. 
 135  Id.; see also Ted Robbins, Border Patrol Program Raises Due Process Concerns, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 13, 2010), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129780261 (discussing the 
implementation and effects of Operation Streamline); Fernanda Santos, Detainees Sentenced 
in Seconds in ‘Streamline’ Justice on Border, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/split-second-justice-as-us-cracks-down-on-border-
crossers.html (explaining some people may be sentenced in as little as twenty-five seconds).  
 136  See Yoffe, supra note 71 (explaining how the bureaucratic system encourages poor 
people who cannot pay bond to plead guilty and get time served rather than remain in jail 
while the misdemeanor is investigated).  
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involved: the courts move cases along quickly, the prosecutors boast 
high conviction rates, and the defendants get to quickly dispose of 
the case with no further immediate consequences.137 As Judge 
Bowman suggested, it is not difficult to imagine such a system 
processing people along so quickly that those being convicted have 
little or no understanding of what is happening. 
C. CLASS 
A final irrationality in using prior convictions to enhance 
sentences concerns the extent to which the prior length of 
incarceration increases a defendant’s criminal history score, as it 
does in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and various state systems. 
As a close look at misdemeanor practice illustrates, this practice 
punishes poverty far more than it reflects criminal culpability or 
amenability to rehabilitation.138  
In United States v. Yuselew,139 the defendant received a one-point 
increase in his criminal history score for a prior “conviction for 
patronizing a prostitute.”140 The Guidelines specifically exempt 
prostitution convictions from criminal history calculations, unless 
such a conviction carried a sentence of “a term of imprisonment of 
at least thirty days.”141 At his arraignment on the 
patronizing-a-prostitute charge, Yuselew was given a $100 cash 
 
 137  See id. (“Ideally, plea bargains work like this: Defendants for whom there is clear 
evidence of guilt accept responsibility for their actions; in exchange, they get leniency. A 
time-consuming and costly trial is avoided, and everybody benefits.”). It is not clear that a 
system that more rigorously protected defendants’ rights would be preferable to those 
defendants:  
Before [Operation] Streamline, immigrants who had already been deported 
at least once faced felony charges that could bring up to two years in jail, 
often on top of the weeks or months they would spend awaiting trial. But 
under Streamline, detention can be as short as [thirty-six] hours before they 
are deported. And given chronic complaints about the conditions in long-term 
immigration detention centers like the West Texas Detention center dubbed 
Hell by detainees, that can mean a lot for many immigrants. 
Stanton, supra note 131. 
 138  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 596–97 n.255 (providing that time served sentences are 
imposed on defendants who are “too poor to pay bond,” and therefore using sentence length 
as a component of impeachment might allow defendant to be impeached by their own poverty 
(citing Motion for Departure, Objections to Presentence Report and Sentencing 
Memorandum, United States v. Yuselew, No. CR 09-1035 JB, 2010 WL 4854683 (D.N.M. Aug. 
5, 2010))). 
 139  Yuselew, 2010 WL 3834418. 
 140  Id. at *2.  
 141  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018).  
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bond.142 But because he could not post the bond, he remained in 
pre-trial detention.143 Forty-four days later, Yuselew was brought 
before the judge, entered a plea of guilty, and was sentenced to the 
time he had already served.144 At his subsequent federal sentencing, 
Yuselew argued that this time-served sentence should not factor 
into his criminal history calculation, as he had not been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.145 
After initially opposing Yuselew’s request to exclude the 
patronizing-a-prostitute charge, the prosecution withdrew its 
opposition during the sentencing hearing due to a “lack of clarity in 
the documents” regarding whether Yuselew received “a time served 
sentence or a deferred sentence.”146 The court nevertheless 
addressed Yuselew’s objection to the criminal history calculation 
and stated that it “would be inclined to conclude that a time-served 
sentence is a term of imprisonment” and therefore to overrule 
Yuselew’s objection to the inclusion of the prior conviction for 
patronizing a prostitute.147 In its discussion of the issue, the court 
made no mention of the economic disparities that would result from 
including time-served sentences like Yuselew’s in criminal history 
calculations.148 
Yuselew’s case illustrates how irrational disparities in 
misdemeanor sentencing practices can be magnified in subsequent 
sentencing decisions. But for Yuselew’s indigency, he certainly 
would have posted the $100 bond to secure his own freedom in the 
misdemeanor prostitution case. Because of his poverty, however, he 
was penalized, both by having to spend that time in pre-trial 
detention and by the additional criminal history point assessed at 
 
 142  Yuselew, 2010 WL 3834418, at *3. 
 143  See id. (“The bond was never posted, and Yuselew remained in prison.”). 
 144  See id. (stating that Yuselew plead guilty and was given a deferred judgment on October 
24, 2007). 
 145  See id. (explaining Yuselew’s argument that patronizing a prostitute is similar to the 
offense of prostitution which is excluded from criminal history calculations). 
 146  Id. at *5 (explaining that ambiguity in Yuselew’s previous plea because if the sentence 
was deferred, then no portion of it could have been served which would provide “no basis to 
find that the term of imprisonment was at least thirty days”). 
 147  Id. at *13; see also United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 998 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Time 
served is real time and time suspended is not.”); Roberts, supra note 13, at 597 n.255 (citing 
Motion for Departure, Objections to Presentence Report and Sentencing Memorandum, supra 
note 139)). But see United States v. Buter, 229 F.3d 1077, 1078 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding 
that a time served sentence on misdemeanor convictions does not qualify as a sentence to a 
term of imprisonment); United States v. Hall, 531 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).  
 148  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 599 (“[R]eliance on prior sentences can magnify 
disparities based on race or poverty.”). 
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his later sentencing—a point that raised his presumptive 
sentencing range from 210–262 months to 235–293 months, an 
increase of more than two years.149 
The common misdemeanor practice of time-served sentences has 
very little bearing on the seriousness of the offense. Instead, it bears 
more on the degree to which the court is overburdened and whether 
the defendant in question can gather the funds necessary to secure 
her freedom prior to the resolution of the case. Without knowing the 
details of a particular court’s practices, one reasonably may 
conclude that, had Mr. Yuselew posted bond immediately upon his 
arraignment, whether after four days or forty-four days, he would 
have received the same sentence: time already served. But because 
of section 4A1.2(c)(1), poor defendants are sentenced more harshly 
for these prior offenses, solely on account of their poverty. 
The shortcuts and mistakes in misdemeanor court do not, of 
course, affect all groups equally. People of color and poor people are 
convicted at disproportionately high rates.150 Because of the 
disparate rate of conviction based on class and race, an uncritical 
application of prior conviction evidence merely compounds and 
aggravates the layers of bias that already exist in the system.151 
Given this backdrop, judges and prosecutors have an ethical duty to 
inquire into the reliability of prior convictions before using them to 
enhance a sentence or upgrade a charge.152 Failure to look critically 
at these convictions is to accept the introduction of evidence skewed 
by racial and economic bias into yet another level of the criminal 
justice system.153 Because we know that racial disparities exist at 
 
 149  See Motion for Departure, Objections to Presentence Report and Sentencing 
Memorandum, supra note 139, at *4. 
 150  See, e.g., Victoria Bekiempis, Why Do NYC’s Minorities Still Face So Many Misdemeanor 
Arrests?, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 28, 2015, 12:11 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/nypd-race-
arrest-numbers-309686 (stating that minorities comprised eighty-six percent of misdemeanor 
arrests in New York City in 2014). 
 151  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 576 (“[D]ue to uneven distributions of criminal 
convictions, and because of race-based assumptions of guilt, [consideration of prior conviction 
evidence] disproportionately affects people of color.” (first citing ALEXANDER, supra note 30, 
at 7; then citing Montre Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the “Untried Conviction” 
Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501, 536 (2010); and then citing Stephen Fortunato, 
Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 57 ME. L. REV. 481, 504 (2005))).  
 152  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 600–03 (describing the ethical obligation for judges and 
prosecutors to think critically about racial disparities before introducing a criminal 
defendant’s record).  
 153  See Carodine, supra note 151, at 514 (“[T]here are enough serious flaws in the system 
as a whole that we should not compound the criminal justice system’s mistakes by using 
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every level of the criminal justice system, we should be skeptical 
about ascribing meaning to data concerning prior convictions.154 
IV. A PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSIGNING WEIGHT TO 
LOW-LEVEL PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
Sentencing courts are reluctant to allow defendants to challenge 
the validity of prior convictions as a part of the sentencing 
proceeding, and there is little clear law that would compel them to 
do so.155 Wary of endless litigation by criminal defendants and in 
search of finality, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that, 
when collaterally attacked, “the judgment of a court carries with it 
a presumption of regularity.”156 This is true even when the prior 
conviction was obtained in the absence of defense counsel.157 
Because of the unreliability of convictions from low-level courts, 
however, sentencing judges should adopt a new framework to 
account for this reality. Courts should be more open to considering 
challenges to prior convictions. Moreover, courts and legislatures 
should consider categorically exempting low-level convictions from 
consideration in calculating criminal histories and applying 
sentencing enhancements. 
A. THE CONTOURS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY 
The “presumption of regularity” allows sentencing courts to rely 
on prior convictions as presumptively valid.158 The presumption is 
 
convictions as evidence in subsequent cases, or we should at least view prior convictions 
offered into evidence with much more skepticism.”). 
 154  See Roberts, supra note 13, at 585–86 (“[M]arked disparities in enforcement necessarily 
call into question any suggestion that a conviction is a reliable indicator of relative 
culpability.”). 
 155  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(f), at 772 (2d ed. 1999) (“[D]ue 
process does not mandate the opportunity during sentencing to challenge prior convictions 
for most sorts of constitutional invalidity.”). 
 156  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468–69 (1938). 
 157  See id. (“Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting in his 
conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden 
of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his 
constitutional right to assistance of counsel.”). 
 158  Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 468). State and 
federal courts widely use the presumption of regularity, although they differ regarding the 
manner and extent to which the defendant bears a burden of production in rebutting that 
presumption. See, e.g., State v. McCann, 21 P.3d 845, 846, 849 (Ariz. 2001) (providing that “a 
rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to prior convictions used to enhance a sentence 
or as an element of a crime” but that a defendant may challenge the presumption with “some 
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rebuttable, and courts have adopted procedural frameworks for 
adjudicating claims that a prior conviction should not be used to 
enhance punishment due to its constitutional invalidity.159 Courts 
generally apply a rebuttable presumption of regularity to the prior 
conviction, and the defendant must satisfy an initial burden of 
production through presentation of evidence that the prior 
conviction was invalid.160 Whether the state or defendant bears the 
ultimate burden of persuasion varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.161 
In Burgett v. Texas,162 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction obtained in a trial at which the defendant was impeached 
with a prior forgery conviction that had been obtained in violation 
of the defendant’s right to counsel.163 In holding that the 
impeachment of the defendant with his prior uncounseled 
conviction was error, the Court explained:  
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. 
Wainwright to be used against a person either to 
support guilt or to enhance punishment for another 
offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, 
since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the 
 
credible evidence”); Rose v. State, 563 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Ga. 2002) (explaining that the 
presumption of regularity attaches to prior conviction upon showing that a defendant pled 
guilty and was represented by counsel, after which the defendant bears the burden of 
producing “some affirmative evidence” of irregularity to rebut the presumption). 
 159  See, e.g., State v. Elling, 463 N.E.2d 668, 670 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1983) (placing the entire 
burden on the prosecution), abrogation recognized by State v. Mullins, No. 99CA15, 1999 WL 
668812 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 1999); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo. 1982) 
(placing the burden of production on the defendant and the burden of persuasion on the 
prosecution); Kelley v. People, 4 N.E. 644, 645–46 (Ill. 1886) (barring defendants from 
challenging prior convictions altogether). 
 160  See Watkins, 655 P.2d at 837 (requiring the defendant to produce evidence that a 
conviction was invalid after which the burden shifts to the prosecution); see also 
State v. O'Neil, 580 P.2d 495, 497–98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (“Defendant has the burden of 
producing evidence . . . that his prior convictions are invalid . . . . Once such evidence is 
produced, the State has the burden of persuasion as to the validity of the prior 
convictions.”); State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (explaining that the burden is 
first “on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence” and that “the burden 
[then] shifts to the State”).  
 161  See generally State v. Okland, 941 P.2d 431 (Mont. 1997) (providing an example of a 
state’s procedural framework and citations to other states’ frameworks). 
 162  389 U.S. 109 (1967). 
 163  See generally id. 
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right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from 
the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.164 
The Court, however, restricted the scope of Burgett in Custis v. 
United States.165 In that case, the Court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that he should have been allowed to contest the validity 
of two prior state-court convictions in his federal sentencing under 
the Armed Career Criminal Act.166 Holding that a defendant may 
not attack a prior conviction in a sentencing proceeding except 
under narrow circumstances, the Court cited the presumption of 
finality that criminal judgments enjoy.167 Recognizing its prior 
ruling in Burgett, the Court held that defendants can attack prior 
convictions only when the basis of the attack is that the conviction 
was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.168 The 
Court further held that the absence of counsel, standing alone, does 
not trigger any right to collaterally attack a conviction. Rather, 
there must have existed a right to counsel that was violated.169  
In Nichols v. United States,170 the Court affirmed a sentence that 
was enhanced based on the defendant’s prior uncounseled 
 
 164  Id. at 115. The Court reached a similar conclusion five years later in United States v. 
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). Three prior state-court convictions were introduced against the 
defendant in his federal trial and were used by the judge at the sentencing hearing. See id. 
at 444. After another state court held that two of those prior convictions were constitutionally 
invalid because of a deprivation of the defendant’s right to counsel, the defendant asked for a 
new trial in federal court, arguing that his federal conviction had been obtained through the 
use of these unconstitutional prior convictions. Id. at 445. Although the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed his conviction, finding the use of the convictions at trial to be harmless error, it 
ordered a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 446. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the grant of 
a new sentencing hearing, reasoning that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was 
“founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” Id. at 447.  
 165  511 U.S. 485 (1994). 
 166  Id. at 496 (explaining that the right to attack collaterally prior convictions will not be 
extended because failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant is a unique 
constitutional defect). 
 167  See id. at 497 (“The interest in promoting the finality of judgments provides additional 
support for our constitutional conclusion.”). 
 168  See id. at 493–96. The Court reaffirmed and extended this rule in Daniels v. United 
States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (confirming that defendants generally cannot collaterally attack 
enhanced sentences based on the validity of a prior conviction because that process would 
offend the integrity of the state’s judgments and the criminal process affords other sufficient 
avenues to appeal), and Lackawanna County District Attorney. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001) 
(declaring that a prisoner who was no longer serving his sentence cannot bring a federal 
habeas action directed solely at those convictions). 
 169  See Custis, 511 U.S. at 497 (requiring a right to counsel be present before a defendant 
has a right to collaterally attack his previous conviction). 
 170  511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
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misdemeanor conviction.171 In his prior misdemeanor case for 
driving under the influence, the defendant was not provided counsel 
and was convicted and fined $250.172 The Court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that using a conviction obtained without 
counsel (or a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel) 
violated the Sixth Amendment.173 Instead, the Court declared that 
use of a conviction to enhance a later sentence was constitutionally 
permissible if the defendant had no right to counsel in the previous 
case.174  
The Court has reached similar results concerning tribal-court 
convictions.175 Because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to 
criminal proceedings in tribal court,176 tribal-court convictions 
necessarily cannot violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In 
United States v. Bryant, the Court allowed the defendant’s sentence 
to be enhanced by a prior uncounseled tribal-court conviction—one 
that would have violated the Sixth Amendment if it had been in a 
state or federal court.177 This decision comports with the more 
general rule that prior uncounseled convictions may be used to 
enhance subsequent sentences or charges if the defendant did not 
have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the previous 
proceeding.178 
 
 171  Id. at 749 (“[A]n uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no 
prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent 
conviction.”). 
 172  Id. at 740. 
 173  Id. at 749. 
 174  Id. 
 175  See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause the Bill 
of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes, tribal convictions cannot violate the Sixth 
Amendment.”). 
 176  See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (2016) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does 
not apply to tribal court proceedings.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 1963 (containing 
very strong language about the importance of recidivism statutes). The defendant in Bryant 
had “a record of over 100 tribal-court convictions, including several misdemeanor convictions 
for domestic assault.” See id. 
 177  Id. at 1954 (stating that an uncounseled tribal-court conviction is valid when used to 
enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction). 
 178  See, e.g., Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403–04 (2001) (explaining 
that defendants “generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence . . . on the ground that 
the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained” unless the challenge is based on a right 
to counsel violation); see also Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–49 (explaining that if the defendant 
had no right to counsel in the previous case, use of that conviction to enhance a later sentence 
was constitutionally permissible); Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1959 (allowing the defendant’s 
sentence to be enhanced by a prior uncounseled tribal court conviction because the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply in tribal courts); United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 
(8th Cir. 2011) (allowing uncounseled tribal-court misdemeanor convictions, which otherwise 
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Following these rulings, lower federal courts restricted the rule 
even further by holding that collateral attacks on prior convictions 
were possible only in cases where the defendant not only had a right 
to counsel, but also specifically alleged a deprivation of that right.179 
Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel or other 
constitutional error typically were not susceptible to collateral 
attacks at future sentencing hearings or for purposes of charge 
enhancements under statutes like the Armed Career Criminal 
Act.180  
These restrictions on collateral attacks added to the ongoing 
debate about whether courts should use juvenile adjudications to 
enhance sentences or charges.181 To the extent that the issue turns 
on just how meaningful the due process reforms in the juvenile 
system have been, observers come to very different conclusions 
about the procedural fairness and reliability of juvenile courts.182 
 
would have violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in U.S. courts, to classify a defendant 
as a habitual offender because the convictions were valid at their inception and not alleged 
to be otherwise unreliable). 
 179  Although Custis dealt with the issue of whether the defendant was eligible to be 
sentenced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, many courts have applied the same 
logic to cases involving the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Bacon, 94 
F.3d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bonds, 48 F.3d 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding 
the previous state conviction was appropriately applied to augment the defendant’s sentence); 
United States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Guideline § 4A1.2 stands in the 
same posture as the Armed Career Criminal Act . . . .”). 
 180  See, e.g., United States v. Escobales, 218 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 2000) (providing that 
there is no right to collaterally attack a prior sentence because of an alleged denial of right to 
jury trial); United States v. Daly, 28 F.3d 88, 89 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A sole exception to the 
prohibition against collateral attack of previous state convictions is for the indigent defendant 
who was not appointed counsel at his state trial . . . . Claims of denial of effective assistance 
of counsel, where counsel was appointed, and involuntarily pleading guilty do not fall within 
this exception.”). 
 181  See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, 
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 902–15 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, 
Juvenile Court] (discussing several of the procedural justice consequences of basing juvenile 
sentences on the seriousness of prior offenses); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: 
A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1057–67 (1995) 
[hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth] (discussing the use of juvenile convictions to enhance 
sentences for adult criminal convictions); Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., The Right to a Public Jury 
Trial: A Need for Today’s Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 239 (1993) (arguing that since 
many juvenile defendants are sentenced more harshly as adult offenders based on 
considerations of their juvenile records, the Sixth Amendment should be extended to provide 
juveniles with a right to a public jury trial). 
 182  Compare United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
use of a prior juvenile adjudication to enhance sentence was unconstitutional because of the 
“significant constitutional differences between adult convictions and juvenile adjudications”), 
with United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[J]uvenile adjudications, 
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Barry Feld, for example, argued that it was “inconsistent to use less 
stringent procedures to obtain convictions in juvenile court in the 
name of rehabilitation, and then to use those same convictions to 
enhance subsequent criminal sentences as adults.”183 Those 
advocating for the use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance 
subsequent criminal sentences, in contrast, argued that as the 
juvenile justice system gradually attained more due process 
protections, its results could be seen as more reliable and 
accurate.184  
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally bars 
impeachment with a juvenile adjudication,185 arguably supports 
preclusion of juvenile convictions to enhance adult sentences. The 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence explained its decision for 
including the general prohibition by reference to the lack of 
procedural safeguards to ensure reliable and accurate factfinding in 
the juvenile context.186 The advisory committee’s note to Rule 609(d) 
explains:  
By virtue of its informality, frequently diminished 
quantum of required proof, and other departures from 
accepted standards for criminal trials . . . , the juvenile 
adjudication was considered to lack the precision and 
general probative value of the criminal conviction.187  
The same concerns regarding the use of juvenile convictions to 
enhance later sentences apply to misdemeanors. Today’s 
misdemeanor courts struggle with similar complaints of lack of 
 
like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an 
exemption.”). 
 183  Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 181, at 1064. 
 184  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY: PRIVACY AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS 24 (1982) (“By extending many of the adult criminal due process 
protections to juvenile trials, the Court has imbued the juvenile trial with elements of 
fairness, impartiality, and dispositiveness customarily associated with adult trials. Thus, 
when a juvenile is found delinquent today there is reason for confidence in the fairness and 
accuracy of that judgment.”). 
 185  See FED. R. EVID. 609(d) (providing that evidence of a juvenile adjudication is only 
admissible if offered in a criminal case, the adjudication was of a witness other than the 
defendant, an adult’s conviction for that offense would be admissible, and admitting the 
evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt or innocence). 
 186  FED. R. EVID. 609(d) advisory committee’s note to subdivision (d) (“The prevailing view 
has been that a juvenile adjudication is not usable for impeachment . . . . This conclusion was 
based upon a variety of circumstances.”). 
 187  Id. 
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reliability, precision, and procedural safeguards.188 Like juvenile 
courts, many misdemeanor adjudications lack the right to a jury 
trial, the formal right to counsel, or meaningful access to the 
effective assistance of counsel, and are characterized by an air of 
informality that tends to undermine confidence in the result.189 
Because of the overlapping critiques of juvenile and misdemeanor 
courtrooms, misdemeanor convictions similarly should be viewed 
with skepticism—especially when used to enhance a later 
sentence—and opportunities to present collateral attacks should be 
less restricted.  
State courts have grappled with the tension between finality and 
due process in using allegedly unreliable prior convictions to 
enhance sentences or upgrade charges. In State v. Von Ferguson,190 
for example, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed the use of a prior 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a charge to a 
felony.191 The government attempted to use Von Ferguson’s prior 
conviction for violation of a protective order to charge him as a 
recidivist after his subsequent felony violation of a protective 
order.192 Von Ferguson objected, arguing that his prior conviction 
had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.193 On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah 
agreed with Von Ferguson that even a misdemeanor resulting in an 
entirely suspended sentence was unconstitutional and invalid 
unless accompanied either by the presence of counsel or a valid 
waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel.194 Because there was no 
 
 188  See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 8 (discussing how lower courts readily 
contribute to mass misdemeanors). 
 189  See id. at 620 (describing the rapid and informal “assembly-line justice” approach in 
misdemeanor courts). 
 190  169 P.3d 423 (Utah 2007). 
 191  See id. at 432 (deciding that “a previous uncounseled conviction imposing a suspended 
sentence cannot be used to enhance a subsequent criminal charge unless the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel”). 
 192  See id. at 425. 
 193  See id. (noting the defendant’s objection that his prior conviction violated his 
constitutional rights because he was not represented by counsel). 
 194  See id. at 428–29 (“An uncounseled misdemeanor conviction imposing a sentence of 
incarceration, either actual or suspended, is not valid. Therefore, a conviction obtained in 
violation of Scott or Shelton cannot be used for enhancement purposes.”). It is clear that a 
misdemeanor conviction imposing a suspended sentence is invalid absent appointment or a 
valid waiver of counsel. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (“‘[A] defendant 
who receives a suspended or probated sentence to imprisonment has a constitutional right to 
counsel.’” (quoting Ex parte Shelton, 851 So. 2d 96, 102 (Ala. 2000))). But lower state and 
federal courts appear to be split as to whether a misdemeanor conviction and sentence of 
“probation” with no suspended term of incarceration is similarly unconstitutional. See State 
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dispute that Von Ferguson had not been represented by counsel in 
connection with the prior misdemeanor conviction, that conviction 
could not be used to enhance his subsequent criminal charge.195  
The Von Ferguson court held that even uncounseled convictions 
are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of regularity, reasoning 
that “courts are assumed to have complied with well-established 
requirements ensuring that any waiver of the right to counsel is 
made knowingly and intelligently.”196 The Supreme Court of 
Montana came to a similar conclusion in State v. Maine,197 a case 
that involved an allegation not of an actual deprivation of the right 
to counsel, but of the ineffective assistance of counsel. 198 The court 
recognized the rebuttable presumption of regularity but rejected the 
state’s argument that a defendant could only collaterally attack 
prior convictions on the basis that they were obtained in violation 
of the defendant’s rights under Gideon v. Wainwright199 and its 
direct progeny.200 The court held that such a restriction would be 
under-protective of defendants’ rights.201 
These cases demonstrate that courts tend to be in broad 
agreement that prior convictions are entitled to a presumption of 
regularity. There is less consensus, however, on the logistics of 
whether and how a defendant can rebut that presumption. Federal 
and state courts differ widely on issues of which party has the 
burden of proof when a prior conviction is called into question, and 
by what standard of proof that party must convince the court. 
B. COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON PRIOR CONVICTIONS: BURDENS OF 
PRODUCTION AND PERSUASION 
Courts differ greatly in assigning burdens of production and 
persuasion in the context of challenging prior convictions at 
sentencing. Some clearly require the defendant to produce evidence 
 
v. Wilson, 771 N.W.2d 228, 233–35 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (collecting federal and state cases 
and describing split of authority in “stand alone probation” misdemeanors). 
 195  Von Ferguson, 169 P.3d at 425.  
 196  Id. at 431 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992)). 
 197  255 P.3d 64 (Mont. 2011).  
 198  Maine was charged with fourth offense DUI, a felony in Montana, because of the three 
prior DUI convictions. Id. at 66. Maine claimed that his attorney at one of his previous DUI 
trials was ineffective for failing to raise the “compulsion” defense, as Maine claimed that he 
had been fleeing an assault when he was apprehended for DUI. Id. at 67.  
 199  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 200  Maine, 255 P.3d at 69, 73. 
 201  Id. at 69. 
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to satisfy the burden of production, after which the ultimate burden 
of persuasion shifts to the prosecution.202 Others have held that the 
defendant, as the moving party, retains the burden of persuasion.203 
Courts that have situated the ultimate burden of persuasion on the 
prosecution have imposed various standards of proof as well.204 
When a defendant challenges a prior conviction, courts must turn 
to some procedural framework to conduct a meaningful review of 
the claim. 
In a recent case from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, the defendant moved to dismiss his indictment 
for illegal reentry,205 arguing that he was deprived of due process in 
the two deportation proceedings that formed the predicate for 
conviction of the instant offense.206 He argued that, because neither 
of the prior deportation proceedings provided him with due process, 
neither could form the prerequisite for a prosecution of illegal 
reentry.207 To the extent another federal statute, the 
“jurisdiction-stripping statute,”208 foreclosed such collateral attacks 
in subsequent prosecutions, the defendant argued that the statute 
was unconstitutional.209 
Although the district court denied the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the indictment, the court agreed that the 
jurisdiction-stripping statute was unconstitutional “to the extent it 
prohibits ‘some meaningful review’ . . . of an alien’s claim that the 
underlying deportation proceeding,” which constitutes an element 
of the criminal charge, “was ‘fundamentally unfair.’”210 Because the 
 
 202  See Raley, 506 U.S. at 33 (“Several [states] . . . take a middle position that requires the 
defendant to produce evidence of invalidity once the fact of conviction is proved but that shifts 
the burden back to the prosecution once the defendant satisfies his burden of production.” 
(first citing Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo. 1982) (guilty plea); then citing State 
v. O’Neil, 580 P.2d 495, 497 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (uncounseled conviction); and then citing 
State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (uncounseled conviction))). 
 203  See id. (“Others assign the entire burden to the defendant once the government has 
established the fact of conviction.” (citing People v. Harris, 459 N.E.2d 170, 172 (N.Y. 1983) 
(guilty plea))). 
 204  See, e.g., Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149 (requiring a preponderance of the evidence); Watkins, 
655 P.2d at 837 (requiring a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Hennings, 670 P.2d 256, 
257 (Wash. 1983) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 205  United States v. Silva, 313 F. Supp. 3d 660 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
 206  Id. at 668–69 (discussing the defendant’s collateral attack).  
 207  Id. 
 208  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(D) (2018). 
 209  See Silva, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 668 (arguing that the statute is either unconstitutional 
when applied to Criminal Illegal Reentry cases or Congress intended that such cases could 
not be premised on expedited removals). 
 210  Id. at 669 (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838–39 (1987)). 
 
964  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:927 
 
statute prohibited judicial review of the underlying administrative 
finding—in that case, the Order of Removal—, the court found that 
it was unconstitutional.211 Similarly, a stringent application of the 
presumption of regularity that precludes examination of the 
proceedings leading to a prior conviction could well violate 
principles of due process. 
In reviewing administrative findings that formed a predicate for 
a criminal conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “where a 
determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a 
critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, 
there must be some meaningful review of the administrative 
proceeding.”212 Such administrative proceedings lack the procedural 
safeguards of the criminal process. When the findings are used 
against a criminal defendant, therefore, courts must supply some of 
the procedural safeguards that were not necessarily present at the 
administrative proceeding below.213 If one understands 
misdemeanor prosecutions as akin to administrative proceedings, 
then the same logic counsels caution against uncritically accepting 
the findings of those proceedings.  
In United States v. Martinez-Cruz,214 the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit dealt with the issue of burdens of production and 
persuasion in the context of a collateral attack on a prior conviction. 
The defendant, Alfonso Martinez-Cruz, pleaded guilty to one count 
of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and argued that he 
 
 211  Id.  
 212  Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 837–38. Mendoza-Lopez involved two defendants who had 
been charged with Illegal Reentry after having been previously subjected to a mass 
deportation proceeding. Id. at 830–31. Both defendants challenged the constitutional validity 
of the underlying orders of removal, arguing that they had not been informed of their right to 
counsel at the group deportation proceeding and that their waivers of various rights at the 
mass deportation proceeding had been unknowing and therefore violative of their due process 
rights. Id. at 831. The trial court agreed with them and dismissed the indictments and the 
circuit court affirmed that decision. Id. at 831–32. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, holding 
that even if Congress intended to preclude collateral challenges to previous deportation 
orders in this context, such a rule violated the due process rights of the defendants. Id. at 
837. 
 213  Id. at 841. The Mendoza-Lopez Court did not rule on what level of process was required 
in the underlying administrative proceeding, only that the results of such proceedings may 
only be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution if some review is available to the 
defendants. Id. at 839 (“Depriving an alien of the right to have the disposition in a deportation 
hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be made available 
in any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceeding is used to 
establish an element of a criminal offense.”). 
 214  736 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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should be sentenced pursuant to the federal “safety valve.”215 The 
offense of conviction carried a mandatory minimum term of 
incarceration of five years, subject only to the safety valve 
exception.216 Martinez-Cruz qualified for the safety valve in every 
respect but one: his prior state-court DUI conviction from Georgia 
rendered him ineligible.217 Martinez-Cruz would have faced a 
presumptive Guidelines range of between forty-six and fifty-seven 
months if the prior DUI conviction were not used in calculating his 
criminal history score.218 But the prior conviction, which 
disqualified him from the safety valve, caused his Guidelines range 
to more than double.219 Accordingly, the lower court sentenced him 
to eighty-one months in prison, the low end of what the court 
determined to be the applicable Guidelines range.220 
Martinez-Cruz argued at sentencing that his prior DUI 
conviction was unconstitutional and invalid because he had never 
been informed of his right to counsel and so had not voluntarily and 
knowingly waived that right.221 In support of this claim, he 
submitted two affidavits to the court stating that he was illiterate 
in both English and Spanish, that nobody had explained to him his 
right to counsel or the waiver-of-rights form that he signed, and that 
 
 215  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2018) (allowing sentences below statutory minimums for 
defendants who have little to no criminal history and truthfully disclose information to the 
government about the crime before sentencing). 
 216  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (2018) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 
five years for violations involving five grams or more of methamphetamine); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(f) (2018) (limiting applicability of statutory minimums in certain cases). 
Martinez-Cruz was assessed one criminal history point for his prior Georgia conviction and 
two additional points because the offense for which he was facing sentencing happened while 
he was on probation for the Georgia DUI conviction. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1000. 
 217  Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1000 (explaining that the defendant’s criminal history score 
was three points due to a DUI conviction, which rendered him ineligible for a reduction). 
 218  See id. (explaining that the reduction would have resulted in a two-level decrease of the 
defendant’s base offense level and a two-and-a-half-year decrease of the bottom of the 
Guidelines range). 
 219  See id. (explaining that “because of a prior driving-under-the-influence 
conviction[,] . . . his criminal history score was in fact three points” rather than just one). The 
court imposed an eighty-one-month sentence, the bottom of the Guidelines range, because the 
DUI conviction raised Martinez-Cruz’s criminal history to three points. However, had the 
DUI conviction not been counted, Martinez-Cruz’s base offense level would have decreased 
by two levels, which would have resulted in a two-and-a-half-year sentence decrease from the 
bottom end of the recommended range—a fifty-one-month sentence instead of an 
eighty-one-month sentence.  
 220  See id.  
 221  See id. (“Martinez-Cruz maintain[ed] that at the time of his plea to the DUI charge he 
was not properly informed of his right to counsel, and thus did not validly waive that right, 
so that the DUI conviction was in violation of the Constitution.”). 
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he had no memory of appearing before a judge.222 Additional 
evidence showed that the prior conviction had been entered only two 
days after the Martinez-Cruz’s arrest in Georgia.223 He “spoke no 
English, and could neither read nor write Spanish.”224 After having 
been arrested and detained for two days, he was brought to court 
from jail and was offered a time-served plea, which he accepted.225 
He also “received a waiver-of-counsel form in Spanish” and “printed 
his name on [it].”226 There was no transcript from the plea 
proceeding.227  
Without taking testimony, but after having considered the 
affidavits submitted by Martinez-Cruz, the sentencing court found 
that the defendant had “failed to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that this was not a conviction that he knowingly 
accepted.” Martinez-Cruz had failed, therefore, to satisfy the burden 
of proof.228 The sentencing court rejected his argument that the 
evidence of his inability to read coupled with the lack of evidence 
showing that his rights were explained to him satisfied his burden 
of production by creating a “fair inference” that he never knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.229  
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, but it took 
pains to limit the reach of its holding.230 Much of the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding in Martinez-Cruz builds upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Parke v. Raley.231 In Parke, the defendant was sentenced 
as a “persistent felony offender” under a recidivist sentencing 
 
 222  See id. at 1001 (“In a pair of affidavits attached to his two sentencing memoranda, 
Martinez-Cruz asserted not only that he was illiterate, but also that nobody explained to him 
the waiver-of-counsel form, that he did not recall appearing before a judge, and that he was 
absolutely certain that if he did appear before a judge, the judge did not conduct an 
individualized plea colloquy of the sort that took place at the time of his methamphetamine 
plea. Absent an explanation of his right to counsel that he could understand, Martinez-Cruz 
argues, a waiver of that right could not be knowing and intelligent . . . .” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 223  See id. (stating that the defendant pleaded guilty after spending two days in jail). 
 224  Id. 
 225  See id. (“He spent two days in jail before pleading guilty; in exchange for his plea, his 
sentence was limited to time served and one year’s probation.”) 
 226  Id. 
 227  See id. (“The court did not keep a transcript of the plea . . . .”). 
 228  Id. 
 229  Id. (discussing the defendant’s argument that the inference must shift the burden of 
persuasion to the government). 
 230  See id. at 1002 (“Today we consider how heavy a burden may be assigned the 
defendant—but only in cases where the defendant alleges that a prior conviction or plea was 
secured in violation of the right to counsel.”). 
 231  506 U.S. 20 (1992). 
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statute.232 To overcome the presumption of regularity attached to 
prior convictions, Kentucky required defendants to “produce 
evidence that his or her rights were infringed or that some 
procedural irregularity occurred.”233 Only after satisfying such a 
burden of production did the Kentucky law impose a burden of 
persuasion on the government.234  
The defendant challenged this scheme, arguing that imposing 
any burden at all on the defendant violated due process. But the 
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, instead 
holding that a presumption of regularity did not violate the 
defendant’s constitutional rights: “Even when a collateral attack on 
a final conviction rests on constitutional grounds, the presumption 
of regularity that attaches to final judgments makes it appropriate 
to assign a proof burden to the defendant.”235  
Parke did not, however, specify precisely what type of burden was 
permissible or what standard of proof would govern. As the 
Martinez-Cruz court read the Parke decision, it “d[id] no more than 
uphold the constitutionality of requiring a defendant to meet a 
burden of production.”236 The majority in Martinez-Cruz said that 
the issue presented “a tension between two basic presumptions of 
our legal tradition”: (1) the presumption of regularity that attaches 
to final judgments, and (2) the “unique constitutional defect” that is 
the failure to provide counsel.237 The presumption of regularity 
exists because “[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to 
undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures and 
inevitably delay and impair the orderly administration of justice.”238 
Moreover, resources dedicated to the re-examination of old cases are 
unavailable for reaching judgments in new cases.239 
 
 232  Id. at 23 (describing defendant’s status as a persistent felony offender based on two 
burglary convictions). 
 233  Id. at 24. 
 234  See id. (“If the defendant refutes the presumption of regularity, the burden shifts back 
to the government affirmatively to show that the underlying judgment was entered in a 
manner that did, in fact, protect the defendant’s rights.”). 
 235  Id. at 31. 
 236  United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 237  Id. at 1002–03. 
 238  Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497 (1994) (discussing this as mentioned in 
Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1003). 
 239  See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1003 (“[I]t seems plain that resources devoted to 
reexamination of judgments in old cases are unavailable for reaching accurate judgments in 
new ones.”). But see id. at 1006–08 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (focusing on the long tradition 
in American courts of punishing recidivists more harshly than first-time offenders). On the 
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The court explained at some length why alleged violations of the 
right to counsel are different in nature and more serious than 
allegations of other types of procedural errors, and why its analysis 
did not necessarily extend to other types of collateral attacks on 
prior convictions.240 Moreover, reviewing courts can analyze the 
merits of an alleged violation of a defendant’s right to counsel in a 
prior proceeding with relative ease.241 In contrast to other types of 
alleged constitutional infirmities, in cases where the defendant 
alleges a previous violation of his or her right to counsel, “the only 
issue will be whether [the defendant] validly waived counsel. If that 
involves ‘rummaging,’ it is only with respect to a relatively narrow 
issue.”242 
In describing what kind of showing a defendant must make 
before the ultimate burden shifts to the government, the 
Martinez-Cruz court said: 
[T]he defendant [must] produce[] objective evidence 
sufficient to support a reasonable inference that his 
right to counsel was not validly waived. That evidence 
must entail more than a silent record, or even the 
defendant’s sworn statement that he was not informed 
of his rights. To carry this burden, the defendant’s 
evidence generally must supply a reason to believe that 
the court had no ordinary procedure capable of 
apprising him adequately of his rights or that the court 
did not follow its own procedures.243 
 
concept of finality, see Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall 
Within the Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255(e), 108 GEO L.J. 287, 293 n.37 (2019). 
 240  See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1003 (“Anti-recidivist provisions . . . can extend the 
effects of an invalid conviction, making it the basis for progressively more severe penalties. 
The right to counsel is a shield against that result. By radically reducing the risk that a 
defendant might be convicted in violation of other rights, it helps to forestall such a spiral of 
error.”). 
 241  See Custis, 511 U.S. at 496 (“[F]ailure to appoint counsel at all will generally appear 
from the judgment roll itself, or from an accompanying minute order. But determination of 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure to assure that a guilty plea was 
voluntary, would require sentencing courts to rummage through frequently nonexistent or 
difficult to obtain state-court transcripts or records that may date from another era, and may 
come from any one of the 50 states.”). 
 242  See Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d at 1004. 
 243  Id. 
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The Martinez-Cruz court posited that it generally would not be 
difficult for the prosecution to satisfy the ultimate burden of 
persuasion in such cases, rejecting the government’s contrary 
argument:  
Here, for example, the government might have 
introduced information on the typical plea practices in 
Gwinnett County[, Georgia]. . . . The government might 
also have secured an affidavit from the judge before who 
Martinez-Cruz entered his plea, stating in some detail 
what practices were routine at the time the plea was 
made.244  
Although the Martinez-Cruz court does not address this issue, a 
requirement that a court evaluate the validity of a challenged prior 
conviction before using it would serve a beneficial educational and 
reform function, especially for low-level courts. The prospect of 
having to describe the actual workings of the court might lead 
judges and other actors to be more careful about the administration 
of justice, especially in courts that, for all practical purposes, are 
never reviewed by any superior court. Direct appeals from 
misdemeanor courts are very rare, and requiring prosecutors to 
learn about and reveal what happens in those courts could have a 
positive effect on how those courts administer justice. 
State courts, too, have come to different conclusions about which 
party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion as well as what a 
defendant must produce to initially rebut the presumption of 
regularity. The Supreme Court of Utah, in the Von Ferguson case,245 
recognized that even an uncounseled conviction was entitled to a 
presumption of regularity.246 The court went on, however, to address 
the weight of that presumption and the manner in which a 
defendant might rebut it.247 The court concluded that the 
presumption required only minimal evidence to be overcome by the 
 
 244  Id. 
 245  State v. Von Ferguson, 169 P.3d 423 (Utah 2007); see also supra notes 190–196 and 
accompanying text. 
 246  See Von Ferguson, 169 P.3d at 430 (“Even those judgments based on uncounseled 
convictions are entitled to a presumption of regularity.”). 
 247  See id. at 426 (“Ferguson may rebut this presumption, however, by offering minimal 
evidence that the conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. If he does so, 
the burden of establishing the validity of the conviction shifts back to the State.”).  
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defendant because to require more could undermine defendants’ 
constitutional rights, shift the ultimate burden to defendants, and 
erode the “special status” of claims alleging deprivation of the right 
to counsel.248 The Von Ferguson court made clear that a defendant’s 
own testimony, without more, was sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of regularity in such contexts, after which the 
government bore the burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of 
whether the underlying conviction was validly obtained.249 
The Supreme Court of Montana addressed the question of how 
rebuttable the presumption is in State v. Maine.250 The court first 
recited its procedural framework for evaluating claims that a prior 
conviction was invalid, recognizing that the prior conviction carries 
with it a presumption of regularity that can be rebutted by “direct 
evidence” of its invalidity by the defendant, after which the state 
must produce direct evidence and “prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the prior conviction was not entered in violation of the 
defendant’s rights.”251 The court then held that a defendant could 
attack a prior conviction for any type of constitutional invalidity but 
that, as the moving party, the defendant should bear the ultimate 
burden of persuasion that the prior conviction was invalid.252 The 
court explained that the defendant must present “affirmative 
evidence” that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained 
and that “[s]elf-serving statements by the defendant that his or her 
conviction is infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of 
regularity.”253 Although the court assigned some burden to the 
 
 248  See id. at 432 (explaining the court’s trouble with requiring more than defendant’s own 
testimony). 
 249  See id. (“In summary, although [Von] Ferguson must do more than merely produce a 
copy of the conviction reflecting that he was not represented by counsel, he need only come 
forward with some evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity. His own testimony that 
he did not waive his right to counsel is sufficient for this purpose. If [Von] Ferguson produces 
such evidence, the burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that [Von] Ferguson knowingly waived his right to counsel.” (citing State v. Baker, 
485 N.W.2d 237, 248 (Wis. 1992))); see also State v. Kvislen, 64 P.3d 1006, 1010–11 (Mont. 
2003) (explaining that defendant’s submission of an affidavit stating that he had not been 
advised of his trial date or of his right to counsel was sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
regularity and the trial court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing on whether the 
state could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his prior conviction was 
constitutionally valid). 
 250  255 P.3d 64 (Mont. 2011). 
 251  Id. at 68. 
 252  See id. at 73–74 (providing that, under Montana state law, “the defendant has the initial 
burden to demonstrate that the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm; and . . . once the 
defendant has done so, the State has the burden to rebut the defendant’s evidence”). 
 253  Id. at 74. 
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prosecution, it imposed the ultimate burden of persuasion on the 
defendant, a result different from that in the Von Ferguson case.254 
C. TWO PROPOSALS 
Courts would benefit from a clear and consistent articulation and 
application of burdens of proof in the context of prior conviction 
evidence. Although unchallenged prior convictions will continue to 
enjoy a presumption of validity,255 a defendant should be free to 
contest the validity of any prior conviction that may have been 
obtained unconstitutionally. Of course, in the absence of any such 
challenge by the defendant, a sentencing court is free to consider all 
prior convictions valid for purposes of sentencing.256 As the moving 
party, the defendant should bear the burden of production in 
challenging a prior conviction. This burden should not be satisfied 
by bare or general assertions, but rather by direct evidence that, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, would allow 
a court to conclude that the prior conviction was obtained in 
violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. After the 
defendant makes this prima facie showing, however, the 
prosecution should bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that the 
prior conviction was validly obtained through constitutionally 
appropriate proceedings. If the prosecution is unable to convince the 
sentencing court that the prior conviction was constitutional, then 
the sentencing court should disregard the prior conviction for 
purposes of sentencing. 
Ultimately, however, the factfinding abilities of low-level courts 
have been so called into question,257 and the influence of improper 
factors like racism and poverty so amply demonstrated to have 
perverting effects on outcomes,258 that courts and legislatures 
should consider a categorical rule against including prior 
misdemeanor convictions in calculations of criminal histories. Just 
 
 254  See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.  
 255  See supra Section III.A. 
 256  See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 144 (1998) (holding that prior 
convictions are “sentencing factors” which may be determined by a judge); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(2) (2018) (listing the “history and characteristics of the defendant” as one of the 
factors to be considered in a sentencing hearing). 
 257  See supra notes 5–6, 10. 
 258  See discussion supra Sections III.A, III.C. 
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as convictions from other countries are considered skeptically,259 so 
too should courts have grave reservations about uncritically 
adopting prior conviction evidence from low-level courts in 
fashioning appropriate sentences for those defendants before them.  
Conscientious judges in both state and federal courts continue to 
struggle with both the general principle and the specific procedures 
to consider when a defendant challenges the constitutionality and 
validity of prior convictions. Although a clearer procedural 
framework that places the burden of persuasion squarely with the 
prosecution will assist those judges in resolving specific challenges, 
a larger issue remains. As evidence mounts that low-level courts 
have an adversarialism problem and a resulting accuracy problem, 
courts and legislatures should consider broadly excluding 
misdemeanor convictions from calculations of criminal history. 
Such an approach would be more easily applied in a consistent 
manner and would serve to combat the influences of race and 
poverty that we know infect decisionmaking in the criminal justice 
system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Only a quarter century ago, in denying habeas relief to a prisoner 
who had claimed actual innocence, Justice O’Connor expressed 
incredulity at the idea of a factually innocent person being convicted 
of a crime: “Our society has a high degree of confidence in its 
criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers 
unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent.”260 Little 
did she know that she wrote at the beginning of what would become 
known as the innocence movement, as the advent of DNA evidence 
showed the very real phenomenon of wrongful convictions.261 Times 
have changed since Justice O’Connor wrote those words, and society 
has rightly become more skeptical about the ability of the criminal 
justice system to achieve accurate results. It is time now to 
incorporate this newfound and hard-won skepticism into our 
 
 259  See Alex Glashausser, The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predicates for 
Sentence Enhancements Under Recidivist Statutes, 44 DUKE L.J. 134, 137–52 (1994) (finding 
that treatment of foreign convictions has been uneven in U.S. courts due to concerns about 
the reliability of criminal justice systems in foreign countries). 
 260  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993). 
 261  See supra note 9. 
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jurisprudence, especially when dealing with low-level courts and 
their spotty record of accuracy in determining guilt. 
After Ferguson and the innocence movement, we have ample 
reason to believe that low-level convictions are not reliable, and that 
other values, such as efficiency and profitability, predominate over 
accuracy and reliability in the adjudication of misdemeanors.262 As 
we have become less convinced of the reliability of low-level 
convictions, however, we have magnified their effects on the 
adjudication of subsequent cases. We now know of the levels of 
inaccuracy in low-level lower courts. The doctrine must evolve to 
incorporate this new knowledge in the same way that the DNA 
revelations have led us to understand wrongful convictions and 
false confessions. 
The problems with accuracy and reliability in misdemeanor 
adjudication cannot be overlooked simply because they are minor 
crimes without serious consequences. Our system of criminal justice 
has “a proportionality problem. Minor misdemeanors can trigger 
massive collateral consequences, often without adequate notice or 
meaningful process. Outcomes systematically appear arbitrary, 
disproportionate, and procedurally unfair.”263 Even well-meaning 
police and prosecutors in misdemeanor courts are unable to control 
the collateral consequences of the charges they pursue. One scholar 
accuses police and prosecutors in low-level courts of having 
“abdicated responsibility for regulating key aspects of the harm that 
stems from misdemeanors.”264 It is difficult, however, for any of 
those actors to control the countless consequences that are applied 
externally by public and private actors. In the case of sentencing 
enhancements and recidivism statutes, however, courts and 
prosecutors have a heightened responsibility—as well as the direct 
ability—to mitigate and regulate this harm. 
Misdemeanor convictions have an outsize influence on 
subsequent convictions and sentences given the rise of 
guidelines-based sentencing systems and the rapid growth in 
volume of misdemeanor courts.265 Increasingly, state governments 
are looking for ways to adjudicate low-level crimes without 
 
 262  See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 263  Jain, supra note 100, at 954. 
 264  Id. at 955. 
 265  See Roberts, supra note 24, at 785 (stating that the number of misdemeanor 
prosecutions has doubled in the past forty-five years and now one in three individuals has an 
arrest or conviction record). 
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counsel.266 Without counsel, other procedural safeguards fall away 
as well. There is frequently no real incentive to challenge an 
underlying conviction, especially in a misdemeanor case.267 Often, 
defendant and state are complicit in resolving cases in a way that 
has nothing to do with accuracy. If misdemeanor courts are not 
primarily concerned with accuracy as a value, we should hesitate 
before using those results automatically to enhance subsequent 
charges and sentences.  
Ultimately, any reform to the practice of using prior conviction 
evidence represents a shift in the meaning of a criminal history. 
Even low-level convictions can be considered symbolic “markers” of 
who is within and outside of the community of upstanding citizens. 
But as evidence mounts about how little such convictions have to do 
with moral culpability or even accurate factfinding, they become 
less meaningful as any kind of marker at all. As described above, 
Congress determined that criminal convictions from foreign courts 
and tribal courts—as well as juvenile delinquency adjudications—
would not be factored into criminal history scores under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.268 The lack of guarantees ensuring 
reliability of such convictions would make their use in enhancing 
sentences under the Guidelines unfair.269 
Because of changes in the charging and processing of low-level 
crimes, the cultural meaning of a misdemeanor conviction has 
changed. Increasingly, there is an understanding that “the nature 
and expanding reach of the criminal justice system undermine the 
 
 266  See SPANGENBERG PROJECT, CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., 
AN UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS IN MISDEMEANOR RECLASSIFICATION, PENALTY REDUCTION 
AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING 1 (2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendant
s/ls_sclaid_def_aba_tsp_reclassification_report.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing how states 
have reclassified certain crimes into non-jailable offenses to decrease caseloads for public 
defenders and reduce court dockets).  
 267  See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 736 F.3d 999, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the onus is on the defendant, not the government, 
to point out defects with prior convictions, when challenging sentencing guidelines). 
 268  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(h) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018); see also id. § 4A1.2(i) (providing that “[s]entences resulting from foreign convictions” 
and “tribal court convictions are not counted”). 
 269  See United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Were a global approach 
required, we would soon find it necessary to determine the appropriate evidence that must 
be produced by the prosecution to show that the activity occurred and that it violated foreign 
law.”). 
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assumption that convictions necessarily connote moral 
culpability.”270 This change in perspective regarding the 
moral meaning in the criminal law has come about not 
only because of a shift in culpability requirements of 
conviction, but also because of the characteristics of 
those who are most likely to be subject to a criminal 
conviction. The prevalence of social disadvantage 
among the convicted complicates the notion that 
character flaws are responsible for criminal 
convictions.271  
As the scope of the criminal law has expanded in recent years, 
and as more crimes involving strict liability have grown, the 
meaning of a criminal conviction has become less clear. As it 
becomes easier and easier to transgress the criminal law,272 a 
criminal conviction no longer correlates either with factual guilt or 
moral blameworthiness. Courts should not be shy about taking 
account of these changed circumstances when evaluating criminal 
histories from low-level courts. 
  
 
 270  Roberts, supra note 13, at 587. 
 271  Id. at 589. 
 272  See id. (noting Harvey Silverglate’s theory that every person unwittingly commits three 
felonies a day, making criminal behavior a societal norm (citing L. Gordon Crovitz, You 
Commit Three Felonies a Day, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2009, 11:09 PM), 
http://perma.cc/VGV8-ELQ9)). 
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